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The publication of the Family
Observer coincides with the
10th anniversary of the
European Observatory on
Family Matters. The
importance of this institution
should be duly acknowledged:
Because family policy remains
a national competence of the
EU-Member States, it is all the
more important to monitor
and analyse developments
affecting families and family
policies on a Union-wide
level. In the past few years,
Europe has become increas-
ingly aware of the family’s
social relevance. Looking at
other countries can be
instrumental for drawing the
proper conclusions from the
latest developments and for
implementing up-to-date
measures and new concepts
on family policy. This not only
applies to the challenge posed
by a changing population but
also to such issues as the need
to find better ways of
reconciling family and work in
a dynamic European
economy. What holds true for
other issues addressed by
family policies also applies
here: When dealing with this
topic, family politicians are
European society is changing.
Couples, children, marriage,
families, no longer occupy the
same place in society that they
used to. A declining birth-rate
in almost all Member States of
the Union, fewer marriages,
more couples living together
and children born out of
wedlock and a rising divorce
rate, this is the patchwork of
features which today influence
the family unit and, indeed,
society as a whole.
Interest about the situation of
families and its implications for
employment and social policy
has long been expressed in
different fora. Its distinguishing
feature has been the growing
conviction of the need for
increased international co-
operation on family issues as
part of the global effort to
advance social progress and
development.
Although the Community has
no direct competence in the
area of family policy, it has
increasingly turned its attention
to examining and understand-
ing the social and economic
implications of trends and
change in society on families.
Within the framework of its
policy on equal opportunities
for women and men, in
particular, the Commission has
undertaken several initiatives
aiming at reconciling work and
family life.
Indeed, the challenge of
achieving better reconciliation
between these two aspect of
everyday life is central to a
whole range of social issues.
Changes in the composition of
labour force, new forms of
work organisation, the
restructuring of social
protection, changes in the
distribution of caring work
between women and men, all
these are issues whose bearing
is crucial on families.
The Maternity Directive, the
Parental Leave Directive, the
Part Time Work Directive, the
Recommendation on Childcare
are all examples of the
European Union’s commitment
to supporting both women and
men in their roles, both at work
and within the family, while the
Employment guidelines give an
important impetus to the
objective of reconciliation
between work and family life.
The social and political
situation has undergone
profound changes in the past
decade in Europe. New family
patterns and new concepts of
the role of men and women
have emerged. The European
Union has an important role to
play in identifying the
similarities and differences in
the ways that Member States
react to these changes and also
in stimulating Union-wide
debate on the subject of the
family, by encouraging Member
States to share information and
pool their experiences while, at
the same time, respecting the
principle of subsidiarity.
This is exactly the task which
the Family Observer is called
on to accomplish, by serving as
a platform for discussion and
exchange of experience and
ideas between Member States
on family matters.
Odile Quintin
Acting Deputy Director General
European Commission
Directorate-General for Employment
and Social Affairs
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A new team and 15 national experts of the European Observatory
on Family Matters have compiled this magazine for you. Short
country reports, new scientific insights and an innovative layout
should help you discover new approaches to the topic of family. To
better achieve this end, we even invited artists to participate in a
competition jointly organised with Lioba Reddeker, the Federal
Curator of Arts in Austria. The winner has illustrated this issue with
photos depicting a child’s everyday life. In this way, we have tried to
design the magazine so that it would not only focus on the
perspective of adults, but also include that of children. This is
intended to mirror everyday life, where the views of all family
members must be accommodated.
In a European publication, the different levels of knowledge of a
multivariate readership are a great challenge. Many are well
informed on the situation in their own country but might be a little
less up-to-date about their neighbouring countries. With our brief
country reports, we have tried to offer something for everybody. It
would have been impossible to shed light over such a broad
spectrum without the expertise of the Observatory’s national
experts. We take this opportunity to sincerely thank them for their
collaboration and support.
We hope that the Family Observer will accomplish our aims and
meet your expectations. Feel free to use the questionnaire on 
page 41 for your suggestions, wishes or comments. We are eagerly
looking forward to your response!
Irene Kernthaler and 
Sylvia Trnka
Welcome to the Family Observer! 
Martin Bartenstein
well advised to pay special
attention to the childhood
perspective.
The European Observatory 
on Family Matters has been co-
ordinated by the Austrian
Institute for Family Studies since
1998. I take great satisfaction in
passing on to the public the
proven quality standards
achieved by this Austrian
research institute within the first
five years of its existence. I hope
you will find Family Observer
interesting reading material.
Martin Bartenstein
Minister of Family Affairs, Austria 
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W
ill Europe
die out?
How do
Euro-
peans
want to
organise their family life? Is
there progress regarding equal
opportunities for women and
men? How does the relationship
between the generations of
young and old develop in
Europe? Besides important
economic issues, these questions
are on the minds of the people
building the common European
house. All the Member States of
the European Union are
undergoing major demographic
and socio-economic changes. It
does not suffice to merely
deplore or applaud these
developments. Without wanting
to interfere in the national affairs
of Member States, the European
Commission is interested in
understanding and objectively
dealing with the topic of family.
To facilitate this task, it
established a European
Observatory. It addresses such
issues as the family’s economic
role, the significance of families
for intergenerational solidarity,
and the legitimate wish on the
part of women to actively and
unconditionally participate in
the labour force. These questions
are to be dealt with primarily by
providing regular information on
population developments as well
as family-relevant data. In
pursuit of this aim, national
experts in all EU Member States
routinely collect and analyse
data on the structure of
households, the development of
birth rates, and women’s share in
the labour market.
Yet it is not only the data that
keep on changing. Even the
term ‘family’ is disputed at the
European level. All debates
focus on the crucial question,
“What actually constitutes a
family?” Although it has been
the subject of heated debates for
years – especially at the political
level – the problem does not
pose itself as such for the
Observatory. Studies have shown
great diversity in the individual
concepts of what makes up a
family. When asked about her
family, a child said that her
divorced mother’s new partner
was not part of the family, but
the dog and cat were. The
experts working for the Observ-
atory stick to the pragmatic
solution of not defining what
constitutes a family, but rather of
describing and analysing it in
line with the respective
problems.
As family policies may be based
on different motivations,
political measures having an
impact on families also vary
greatly within the European
Union. Yet these different
motives are hardly ever made
explicit. This explains why
family politicians of different
national states use the same
words in their meetings, though
the terms denote completely
different things. Facilitating
mutual understanding by
providing information and
knowledge is one of the
Observatory’s main tasks. The
German sociologist Franz Xaver
Kaufmann distinguishes seven
different types of motives
underlying family policies in
Europe:
• The family-as-institution
rationale: The family is an
institution of intrinsic value,
based on the model of the
nuclear family.
• The population rationale: The
family secures progeny; pro-
birth policies are often based
on this reasoning.
• The economic rationale: Here
the focus is on the family’s
economic contributions to
education, housework, caring
for relatives, etc.
• The society rationale:
Transcending economic
considerations, the focus is on
the family’s contribution to all
spheres of society.
• The social rationale: Here the
focus is on the financial
disadvantages caused by child-
related expenses and the—at
Irene Kernthaler • Sylvia Trnka • Helmut Wintersberger
10th Anniversary
of the European
Observatory 
on Family
Matters
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least partial—renunciation of
remunerative work. Pro-
ponents of this reasoning
demand that these disad-
vantages be compensated.
• The feminist/female rationale:
On the one hand, this
reasoning shows that financial
disadvantages tend to hit
women only. On the other
hand, the focus is on the
equality of women and men
with regard to work both
within the family and at the
workplace.
• The children rationale: Here
the focus is on the child’s
well-being.
F
rance, with its
alliance
nationale in
pursuit of a
pro-birth family
policy already a
century old, is a pioneer for an
explicit family policy. Within the
European Union, France
currently is second only to
Ireland in high birth rates.
Belgium and Luxembourg also
have centrally organised family
policies. In Scandinavia, family
policy is integrated into social
policy, and thus very equality-
conscious. The German-
speaking countries attach great
importance to the topic of the
family as such. In Germany, the
protection of the family is even
laid down in the Constitution,
though the country has failed to
develop a firm political will for a
sustainable family policy. The
Anglo-Saxon countries
outrightly reject the idea of a
family policy but do want to
guarantee a minimal subsistence
existence to particularly disad-
vantaged groups. In southern
Europe, family policies are a
rather new development
connected to recent changes in
society.
In his 1996 synthesis of national
family policies, John Ditch, co-
ordinator of the Observatory
from 1994 to 1997, pinpoints the
challenge posed to Europe by
the family topic: “The prosperity
of all member states of the
European Union cannot be
contradicted and is confirmed
by economic indicators. When
compared with the economies 
in transition the individual
economies of the EU are
prosperous and successful. But
there can be no room for self-
congratulation and com-
placency: too many children
experience lives of misery and
deprivation because their
parents lack employment; too
many families live in sub-
standard accommodation; too
many fathers see too little of
their partners and their children
because they are working too
many hours; too many women
are excluded from the labour
force, or held back within it; too
many parents struggle with the
precarious and sometimes
irreconcilable demands of
employment and family life; too
many relationships break down
in sadness and despair because
too many demands have been
made of the partners: in turn,
the cost to those individuals,
their children and wider society
are too great to tolerate with
indifference and equanimity.”
W
e are
facing a
strong
tension
be-
tween
unprecedented technological
and economic progress on the
one hand, and the precarious
situation of many families and
individual family members on
the other hand. One could
compare this tension with a
human being whose muscles
and cognitive intelligence have
grown in the course of
evolution, while personal
development has stagnated or
even receded at the emotional
and relationship level. In the
modernisation process, the
resources and margins of action
have considerably expanded for
private enterprises and public
administrations; but this
definitely does not apply to
families and households in any
comparable way. It certainly
cannot be denied that the
position of households as
consumers was particularly
strengthened, in the interest of
Co-ordination Team of the
European Observatory on
Family Matters
Paloma Fernández de la Hoz (equal
opportunities; Catholic Academy of
Social Sciences and Austrian
Institute for Family Studies)
Irene Kernthaler
(public relations; Austrian Institute
for Family Studies)
Wolfgang Lutz (demography;
Austrian Institute for Family Studies
and IIASA)
Wolfgang Mazal (labour law and
social security law; University of
Vienna)
Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann
(European affairs, equal opportuni-
ties; Academy of Sciences)
Helmuth Schattovits (family policy;
Austrian Institute for Family
Studies)
Martin Spielauer (website, database,
economy; Austrian Institute for
Family Studies and IIASA)
Sylvia Trnka (management, co-
ordination; Austrian Institute for
Family Studies)
Helmut Wintersberger (children’s
issues, head of coordination team;
Austrian Institute for Family
Studies)
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The Austrian Institute for Family Studies is an independent, non-
profit organisation for the interdisciplinary, scientific and
application-oriented analysis of the diversity and changes in
familial relationships and structures from the perspective of
children, women and men.
Projects and Areas of Research
FFS ´96 –Individual Life Histories of Family and Working
Conditions
For the first time in Austria, the Family and Fertility Survey (FFS)
provides parallel biographies for 6,500 women and men. (In
collaboration with the UN-ECE and 20 other countries.)
FAMSIM
The development of a prototype microsimulation model, based on
FFS ’96 data, to project and evaluate various measures in the field
of family policy, is supported by the European Union.
Reconciling Family and Work
In 1995, a broad survey was conducted of types, costs and the
financing of child care in Austria. In 1997, the Institute was asked
to conduct a feasibility study on a general child-care voucher
model that could be used either to pay for external child day care
or for a parent to stay at home with the child. Another project
studied the range and the impact of tele-commuting and home
offices on family relations in Austria.
Prevention
Based on the model “Working Group: Parents-Teachers-Pupils:
Partners in Sexual Education” which has been successfully applied
for ten years, training courses for moderators have been organised,
and materials for teachers and pupils have been prepared.
Migration
Using actual court cases, traditional family patterns of immigrants
to Austria are analysed.
Other Projects
Establishing a system to document and observe the socio-
economic situation of families in Austria.
Services
The Institute maintains an information network in the field of
family studies, including relevant organisations, individuals,
databases, books and journals. Its own database contains up-to-
date information from several sources, including the Austrian
Statistical Office, Eurostat, the FFS ’96 (for several countries) and
is available to all interested parties.
Public Relations and Communication
The newsletter ‘beziehungsweise’ appears biweekly and provides
easy access to important results of international and national
family studies. It is an attempt to contribute to a better-informed
discussion on the highly emotional topic of family issues.
Funding
The Institute is financed by projects commissioned by the
Austrian Federal Ministry of Environment, Youth and Family, the
family departments of the Austrian Bundesländer, the European
Union, Procter & Gamble and other institutions and companies.
The Austrian Institute for Family Studies
economic development.
However, their overall
importance for production and
reproduction is hardly ever
perceived.
At the beginning of the 1990s,
the focus was on the distorted
competition between a public
sector developed in the post-war
period and the private economy.
At the threshold to the 21st
century, we have to ask
ourselves, “Isn’t there yet
another serious distortion,
namely in the competition
between the two formal
sectors—the market and the
state on the one hand, and
households and families on the
other?” It is a well-known fact
that the financial compensation
for and social recognition of
activities rendered both in the
public sector and in the private
economy are markedly higher
than those for activities carried
out within the family. Nobody
will deny that caring for
children and the elderly is both
socially necessary and valuable.
We may therefore conclude that
the family is seriously disad-
vantaged when it comes to
competing with public insti-
tutions and private companies.
Studying these disadvantages
and identifying ways to over-
come them could be one of the
priorities of the European Ob-
servatory in the next few years.
The European Observatory was
mentioned for the first time
about ten years ago in
Communication COM (89) 363
final of 8 August 1989, adopted
by the Commission. The
subsequent conclusions of the
Council of Ministers responsible
for Family Affairs, meeting
within the Council on 29
September 1989, led to the 
establishment of the European
Observatory.
F
rom an
organisational
point of view,
the Observ-
atory’s network
has seen a
number of changes in the past
decade. In part, these can be
attributed to the fact that the
European Union was expanded
to include new Member States;
in part, they are due to natural
fluctuations in the network of
national experts. In addition, the
co-ordination team undergoes
rotation at more or less regular
intervals. In the first year, the
Observatory was co-ordinated
from the Institut de l’Enfance et
de la Famille in Paris. From 1990
to 1994, the Catholic University
of Leuven was in charge of the
Observatory, which was sub-
sequently co-ordinated by the
Social Policy Research Unit at
the University of York until
1997.
The last decade has shown that
the focus on family policies is
too narrow. Because many other
areas also play a role, the
mandate of the European
Observatory was expanded in
1999. This is also reflected in its
new name: the former
“European Observatory on
National Family Policies” is
now called the “European
Observatory on Family
Matters”.
Ö
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E
urope—often
called the ‘old
continent’—
truly deserves
this name. The
mean age of
the European population is
higher than that of any other
region in the world, and it gets
older year by year. In exact
figures, the population of the
European Union ages by 2.5
months each year or by two
years each decade. This trend is
likely to continue well into the
next century. The proportion of
the population below age 20 is
likely to decline further. It will
decrease from more than 23
percent to 19 percent, while the
proportion of those above 60
will increase from 21 percent to
34 percent. Simultaneously, the
mean age of the European
population, which presently is
around 39 years, is likely to
reach 45 years by 2030.
Why does the mean age of the
population increase less rapidly
than the individual age of each
one of us, which of course rises
by one year annually? The
difference between individual
ageing and populational ageing
is that, in a population, new
members at the very youngest
age are being added every year.
This is why we speak of
population renewal or
reproduction. Demographers
measure reproduction rates as a
key to understanding future
population dynamics. At the
individual level, there is no
reproduction: Even our own
children cannot perpetuate our
individual life. On the societal
level, it is evident that children
guarantee the survival and
further evolution of the
population. In a population
closed to migration, the laws of
population dynamics clearly
indicate that, if reproduction is
below the so-called replacement
level (and life expectancy has an
upper limit), a population is
heading for significant
population ageing, population
decline, and ultimately for
extinction. The lower the level of
reproduction as measured by
fertility rates, the faster this
process is. However, with
possible extinction still centuries
away and significant population
declines not yet foreseen for the
next half century, the main
reason for concern for Europe
over the next few centuries is
population ageing.
W
Like any other population, the
European population is not an
amorphous and homogeneous
mass. It is structured according
Will Europe 
be Short of
Children?
Europe’s population is ageing.
In 20 years from now, this will
be obvious not only on the
park benches, but also on the
labour market.
Population projections
Wolfgang Lutz
ho
Really
Cares How Old
We’ll All Get?
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to several important criteria. In
Europe, we often refer to factors
such as linguistic, cultural and
national divides; but we some-
times tend to forget about the
two most fundamental structures
of any population, namely age
and gender. Gender has recently
received increasing attention,
and most governments—as well
as the European Commission—
created special bodies to pro-
mote equal opportunities for
women and men. The age
dimension has not yet received
similar attention. For this reason,
a number of European symposia
recently focused on this issue
(among them, “A Society for All
Ages”, organised by DGV and
the Austrian EU Presidency in
Vienna in October 1998).
Why should one be interested in
age? At the individual level, this
sounds like a silly question.
Whether you are one year old,
10 years old, 40 years old or 80
years old is the most important
determinant of how you feel and
live, what you do and what you
still expect from life. It is directly
related to the process of
socialisation, development of
skills, body strength, maturing
and, last not least, the remaining
average life expectancy. On the
level of society, this question is
less obvious. Does it make any
difference whether half of the
population is below age 15, as
we see it in some developing
countries, or whether half of the
population is above age 40, as is
already the case in several
European countries? It is clear
that it makes a difference
regarding the demand for
schools and homes for the
elderly. It is also evident that it
significantly affects the balance
of payments in a ‘pay-as-you-go’
10 Family Observer, 1999
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pension system in which those
who are gainfully employed
today pay for those who are
entitled to retirement benefits. It
is also expected to have
significant implications for the
labour market, and some fear
that an older labour force will
affect productivity in a negative
way. And one may even go
beyond economics and speculate
about changing cultural
preferences and changes in
political power due to the
changing age composition of
those who have the right to vote
come election time.
Are Birth, Death and
Migration Interlinked?
The size and age structures of
future populations are
determined by the present age
structure and future trends in the
three basic demographic
components: i.e. fertility (birth
rate), mortality (death rate) and
migration. The fact that there
are only three factors to be
considered in population
projection does not necessarily
make the task easier, because the
projection of each factor is
difficult and associated with
uncertainties. Even the future of
mortality has recently become
more uncertain, though it is
traditionally considered the most
stable demographic trend and
has shown steady improvements
over the years. Over the last 50
years, life expectancy in Western
Europe has increased by about
ten years, implying an average
gain of two years per decade. In
its medium projection, Eurostat
assumes a gain in life
expectancy at birth of about
three years over a period of 20
years. However, there is
increasing scientific uncertainty
about the limits to human
longevity and, consequently,
about the future gains yet to be
expected. In contrast to the
traditionally dominant view that
we are already very close to such
a limit (actually, the assumed
limits are being constantly
moved upward by projectors as
real gains surpass their
expectations), alternative views
suggest that such limits (if they
exist at all) might be well above
hundred years.
In a longer-time perspective,
fertility is the most influential of
the three demographic
components. Changes in fertility
have an impact not only on the
number of children but also on
that of grandchildren, etc. For
this reason, relatively small
changes in fertility may have
very significant consequences for
the size and age structure of the
future population. Despite its
significance, we know rather
little about the future trends of
fertility in Europe.
The developments since the
Second World War do not help
us to anticipate the future trend:
During the so-called ‘baby-
boom’ of the early 1960s, most
Western European countries had
period fertility rates of above 2.5
children per woman. This was
followed by a rapid fertility
decline during the 1970s, bring-
ing the Western European
average down to about 1.6.
Since then we have seen
diverging trends, typically at
levels well below replacement
fertility. The most significant
fertility declines were found in
Mediterranean countries, with
Italy and Spain having below 
1.2 children per woman. There
are also significant regional
differences within countries. A
further uncertainty is due to the
fact that it is not clear to what
degree these trends are caused
by ‘timing’ changes, i.e. a post-
ponement of births, and to
which extent they reflect the
lifetime fertility of younger
generations of European women
(see box: Cohort and Period
Fertility).
Migration is the most volatile of
the three demographic
components. The number of
people entering or leaving a
country can change from one
year to the next due to political
events or the enforcement of
new legislation. The past ten
years witnessed great ups and
downs in European migration
levels. The problem with
projecting migration trends is
not only the difficulty of
foreseeing such political events,
but also the fact that net
migration is the result of two
partly independent streams
(migration in and migration out)
which depend on the conditions
in the sending as well as in the
receiving countries.
A Greying European
Labour Force:
Probabilistic Population
Projections for the
European Union
Probabilistic projections are a
rather recent methodological
development of IIASA, the
International Institute for
Figure 1: EU, Total Population
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““Having children is defined as work.”
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Applied Systems Analysis in
Austria, which recently
published the first of these
projections for the European
Union. In substance, it is largely
based on the assumptions
produced by Eurostat; the
median is indeed identical with
Eurostat’s baseline scenario.
Figure 1 depicts the probabilistic
projections for the total popu-
lation of the 15 EU Member
States up to 2050. The median
of these projections shows a
slight increase from the currently
375 million inhabitants of the
EU to slightly above 380 millions
in 2015, followed by a moderate
decrease to 345 millions by 2050.
The figure also shows the ranges
of the estimated uncertainty
distribution. The inner 20 percent
are depicted in black, while the
shaded area denotes the inner 60
percent.
Very different from this rather
unexciting chart of the total
population size is that cor-
responding to the proportion
above age 60 (Figure 2). Here,
the uncertainty is not whether it
will increase or decrease, but by
how much the proportion of the
elderly will increase. Presently,
21 percent of Europe’s
population are above age 60.
This proportion will certainly
rise over the coming decades:
The increase is programmed in
today’s age structure. In other
words, it can be considered
virtually certain that the
proportion of the European
population above age 60 will
grow by 8–12 percentage points
or to about 1.5 times of its
current level. This is a very
significant increase by any
standard. The new thing about
these probabilistic projections is
that they cannot simply be
dismissed as ‘horror scenarios’
of unknown probability as the
increase is practically certain up
to 2030.
The proportion of the popu-
lation below age 20 (Figure 3) 
is expected to further decline
over the coming decades, but
does not directly mirror the
development of the proportion
of the elderly. Yet there is a
probability of more than 85
percent that the proportion of
children and teenagers in
Europe will decline. In the
median case, it could decline
from the present 23 percent to
less than 20 percent; but in more
extreme cases, it could go below
15 percent.
A combination of these two
trends results in a significant and
virtually certain increase in the
mean age of the European
population from a present mean
age of 39.3 years to between 44
and 47 years by 2030, and
between 42 and 52 years by
2050. The median is expected to
increase to around 46 years. It is
important to note that these data
also indicate significant changes
in the age pattern of the wor-
king-age population. The
average age of the working-age
population (20–64 years) is
expected to increase from 40.5
years to 43 years as early as
2020. Expressed in yet a
different way, the proportion of
persons aged 50–60 will increase
significantly, while that of the
younger work force aged 20–29
will decline strongly.
Pension systems based on the
transfer across different age
groups will be faced with yet
another significant challenge.
Figure 4 plots the so-called old-
age dependency ratio, which is
commonly defined as the
population above age 60 divided
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by the population aged 20–60.
Although the ratio does not
reflect the true ratio of ben-
eficiaries to contributors in the
social security system, it still is
an important indicator of the
underlying demographic
dynamics. At present, this ratio
is around 38 percent, i.e. there
are still almost three working-
age persons for one person
above age 60. By 2040, this ratio
is likely to almost double to
more than 70 percent. As early
as 2018, there will only be two
working-age people for one
person above age 60. In view of
this knowledge, it is irres-
ponsible to limit the time
horizon of any policy reform to
2015 or even 2010, because we
already know that an even more
significant increase is due
thereafter in connection with the
retirement of the baby-boom
generation.
The probabilistic projections
show that the range of
uncertainty is amazingly small
over the coming decades. This
implies that there are good, hard
data even for longer-term
reforms. In this context,
politicians certainly cannot
blame scientists for supplying
only ambiguous and uncertain
information.
For various reasons including
aspects such as cultural
homogeneity, migration is an
unlikely determinant to remedy
the presumed ageing problem. 
It was shown that even quanti-
tatively massive immigration
does not make much difference
in terms of long-term popu-
lation ageing (assuming that
migrants immediately adopt
European fertility levels). An
annual migration gain of one
million would increase the total
population of Western Europe
by 13 percent (505 millions) by
2050 as opposed to a three
percent decline (433 millions) in
case of no migration. Yet it
would only reduce the increase
in the proportion above age 60
from 17.8 percentage points to
15.7 percentage points. The
main reason for this weak effect
is that migrants get older and
join the population above age 60
(unless they return to their
country of origin).
Slower improvements in
mortality and especially in life
expectancy in old age would
have a three times stronger effect
on the proportion above age 60
than would massive immi-
gration. Yet these factors are
very unlikely candidates for
targeted government policies. In
fact, political measures such as
the changes recently introduced
in Eastern Europe caused a
stagnation in the improvement
of mortality—a side effect
definitely undesired. This leaves
fertility as the only serious
candidate for possible govern-
ment policies to influence the
demographic ageing trend.
W
Fertility levels in most European
countries have reached historical
lows during the 1990s. In the
majority of EU Member States,
period fertility levels are around
two thirds of replacement level
or even lower. It is an open
question whether this is only a
temporary phenomenon caused
by a delay of childbearing to
higher ages, a new steady state
(see box: Cohort and Period
Fertility), or whether fertility
might even continue to decline
further.
Arguments Suggesting a
Further Decline in
Fertility
Trend towards
Individualisation
The individualisation typical of
the society of the 20th century
has been studied by a large
number of sociologists. One
psychological aspect of this
trend is of special interest:
Women and men are
increasingly reluctant to make
decisions that have long-term
consequences and clearly limit
their future freedom of choice.
The decision to have a child
predetermines many options for
the following two decades, and
makes second thoughts
impossible once the child has
been born.
Independent Women
One recent trend that has often
been singled out as a domi-
nating feature of societal change
is women’s increasing economic
independence. Over recent
decades, female labour-force
participation has steadily
increased in virtually all
industrialised countries. The
increase has been strongest in
Scandinavia, where labour-force
participation is almost universal
among adult women below age
50. Female activity rates in
North America are not much
lower. In Italy, female labour-
force participation increased by
more than one third in the
1980s. This fundamental change
in women’s economic activity is
obviously connected to changing
reproductive patterns. Increasing
economic independence of
women also tends to result in a
postponement of marriage,
which typically is associated
with lower fertility.
One must, however, be cautious
in pointing out female economic
activity as a major determinant
of declining fertility. It may also
hat
Determines Future
Fertility Levels?
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be that the lower number of
desired children motivates
women not to stay at home but
rather to enter the labour force,
or there may be another driving
force behind both trends. The
latter possibility is supported by
evidence from several countries
experiencing improvements in
fertility rates despite very high
and still increasing female
labour-force participation. The
key question in this multifaceted
issue seems to be: How can
women (and men) in the future
combine parenthood with
participation in the labour
market?
Flexible Partnerships
Marital stability has declined in
all industrialised countries. Part
of the reason for this
phenomenon clearly lies in
women’s increasing economic
independence. Women are no
longer economically forced to
stay in an unsatisfactory union if
they earn an independent
income. Whatever the social and
psychological reasons may be,
the chances of a young couple
staying together for 20 years—
the minimum time required to
raise a child—are slimmer than
they were in the past.
Increasing evidence from
empirical studies shows that the
separation of parents actually
does more harm to children
than had been assumed in the
past. Responsible prospective
parents may therefore decide not
to have children if they are not
absolutely sure about the
stability of their partnership.
This may be a very important
factor in the decisions of
couples living in consensual
unions, which seem to be much
less stable than marital unions.
One possible counter-argument
would be that remarriage (or
formation of new non-marital
unions) might actually be an
incentive to have an additional
child to strengthen the
relationship with the new
partner.
Children ‘Endanger’
Consumption and
Leisure
Commentators often mention
the increasing consumerism as
an underlying cause for the
recent decline in fertility. The
argument is that people would
rather invest in pleasures for
themselves than in children:
They would rather buy a new
There are two ways to measure the level of a population’s fertility. The first method refers to cohorts,
i.e. groups of women born in the same year who have already completed their reproductive career.
These rates can be measured empirically and do not include an estimate component. The disadvan-
tage of this method is that one must wait until these women reach age 40–45. For this reason, the
data are of historical interest only, as most births happened around 20 years earlier. The second
method measures period fertility and gives up-to-date information. In this case, all age-specific 
fertility rates observed in one year (e.g. in 1998) are added up. The resulting total fertility rate (TFR)
gives the mean number of children of a hypothetical group of women who experience the age-
specific fertility rates as measured in 1998 throughout their lives. The graph shows the trends in these
periodic rates in selected countries.
The two different ways of measuring fertility may lead to somewhat different interpretations of the
recent declines in birth rates. The most recent cohort fertility measures refer to cohorts born before
1955, who had most of their children in the 1970s. These figures are somewhat higher than the 
period rates for the 1990s. The drawback of period rates is that that they exaggerate short-term 
fluctuations and changes in the age pattern of fertility: An increase in the mean age of childbearing
by just 0.1 years (corresponding to a postponement by one year of ten percent of the women) leads
to a ten percent decline in the period fertility rate in that year. Since the mean age of childbearing is
on the rise in most European countries, the currently very low period rates may be partly explained
by this phenomenon
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car than have another child;
they would rather spend their
time watching TV than
changing nappies. Children are
considered work and not fun. In
earlier times, couples had to
work harder and longer to earn
a living and still found the time
to have many children. The
extra leisure time couples have
today is not being spent on
having children. Having children
is defined as work.
Whether childbearing, and
especially childrearing, will
become favoured leisure-time
activities of women and men
will depend on the trade-offs
between fun and burden. Some
European cities already have
more dogs than children. In
these areas, the work-fun
balance obviously is more
favourable for pets, which
require less commitment and in
the worst case can always be
given away. This argument
clearly suggests that unless the
burden of having children is
diminished or the rewards of
having children are enhanced,
the balance for childbearing will
continue to be negative.
Unreliable Contraception
The final argument in this series
is less concerned with changing
values but is at a more mech-
anical level. It is an empirical
fact that a significant number of
pregnancies are unplanned in all
industrialised societies. De-
mographers often distinguish
between timing failure (early
pregnancy) and quantum failure
(unwanted pregnancy). Both
could be reduced by more
efficient contraceptive use: For
the latter, this would clearly
imply lower fertility; for the
former, this would theoretically
have no effect on fertility.
Currently, we are still far from
having a perfect contraceptive
that requires no effort to use and
has no negative side effects. An
increasing number of women
report being tired of using the
pill. Yet sterilisation is not
acceptable to all women and
men (especially in continental
Europe) because of its
irreversibility. A hypothetical,
perfect contraceptive without
any side effects, which is taken
once and then requires some
reverse action for a woman to
become pregnant, certainly
would change the situation. It
would clearly inhibit unplanned
pregnancies, which currently are
still quite numerous. It will
make quite a difference for
future fertility levels whether
one must go to the doctor to
have a child or not to have a
child; currently, the latter is the
case.
Arguments Suggesting
an Increase in Fertility
Fertility Cycles
It is assumed that fertility cycles
also follow certain patterns. The
theory says that the fertility level
of the parents’ generation
determines their children’s
reproductive behaviour. The first
generation has a low relative
income and low fertility. The
second generation grows up
with low aspirations for wealth
but faces favourable conditions
on the labour market because
there are only few competitors.
Hence, it has a high relative
income and high fertility. The
third generation is numerous
and has high aspirations. As a
consequence, it has a low
relative income and low fertility.
Empirically, this model fits
nicely with the US baby-boom
of the 1960s and the subsequent
fertility decline. But this is not a
complete cycle. A new baby-
boom has failed to materialise.
For other countries, the his-
torical long-term cycle argument
is even less applicable.
National Identity and
Ethnic Rivalry
National identity may have an
important influence on
individual reproductive
behaviour. Fears related to the
ethnic composition of the
population and in-group–out-
group feelings can be powerful
emotional forces that may
directly influence fertility.
Examples may be found in
Israel, Northern Ireland and in
the Baltic States (before 1991).
In these areas, there is a clear
In demography, there is a body of literature discussing what is
the maximum fertility that can be achieved in a population. The
highest levels observed were 10.9 children per woman for the
Hutterite community in the US (marriages from 1921–1930) and
10.8 for Canadians in the 18th century. On the national level, the
highest fertility reported by the UN was 8.5 for Rwanda in
1975–1980, with many other African countries having rates
above 8.0 during this period.
In 1998, the Italian demographer Antonio Golini published an
article on how low fertility can go in a population. Besides
giving some of the lowest total fertility rates observed (e.g. 0.77
for Eastern Germany in 1994, or 0.80 for the Italian province of
Ferrara), he also calculates a total fertility rate of 0.72 by combi-
ning the lowest age-specific fertility rates observed between 1990
and 1995 in national populations. With respect to cohort fertility,
he simulates a case in which 20–30 percent of all women remain
childless and the rest has just one child. These data are not dis-
similar to recent conditions in some provinces of northern Italy.
This results in 0.70 to 0.80 children as the lower boundary for
cohort fertility. Whether such low levels will actually be reached
at a national level, and whether they are sustainable in the longer
run in terms of their social and economic implications, are of
course different questions
“
“Economically indepen-
dent women tend to
delay childbearing 
to higher ages.”
How Low Can Fertility Go?
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rivalry between two population
groups that may attempt to
outnumber each other. This
rivalry may be an important
reason why fertility levels are
higher in these countries than in
other countries with similar
socio-economic conditions.
According to one hypothesis,
such rivalry may also be
exported to other industrialised
countries via international
migration. However, there are
also strong counter-examples,
such as Francophone
Canadians, non-Hispanic
Californians, or Germans living
in cities with many Turks, where
ethnic-linguistic rivalry is carried
out by means other than
reproductive behaviour.
C
Potential government policies to
control the number of children
have been a highly controversial
topic in Europe since the 1930s.
Induced by the low birth rates in
many European countries as a
result of the worldwide
economic crisis, the issue was
broadly discussed all over
Europe. At that time, the debate
was very much phrased in
nationalist and eugenic terms.
The results of these concerns,
however, differed dramatically in
the Member States. In Sweden,
for instance, pro-birth policies
had been considered a real
option, but were soon turned
into welfare policies. Nazi
Germany made the “breeding of
true Germans” a national
priority and introduced moral
rather than economic incentives,
including the infamous ‘mother
award’. After the Second World
War, the issue became a non-
topic in most European
countries except for France,
where child support schemes
have had a clear pro-birth
intention focusing more strongly
on higher numbers of births.
The post-war baby-boom peaked
in most European countries in
the early 1960s. It also brought
period fertility rates well above
replacement level, therefore
moving public attention away
from the level of fertility to
family-welfare issues.
Even today, virtually all EU
Member States see child-support
schemes and family benefits
primarily as an instrument of
social policy to ameliorate the
tight economic conditions of
younger families, especially if
they have a larger number of
children. Even some measures
that could be interpreted in a
pro-birth way, such as the
payment of higher child benefits
for the third and subsequent
children in Ireland, have an
explicit social-policy root and
are imbued with the intention of
assisting poorer families.
Increasingly, family policies also
become an instrument of
women’s policies focusing on
female employment and the
compatibility of work and
family. Since the 1970s, two
main features of this trend have
been the expansion of paid
maternity leave and the
provision of public child care in
most European countries.
In view of the significant
fertility declines in many
European countries during the
early 1970s, the debate on low
fertility has re-emerged and
some scientific studies focused
on the possible effectiveness of
state interventions. In general,
these studies failed to detect any
measurable effect of government
policies. Among other things, it
was concluded that the more
significant determinants of
fertility are in areas beyond the
reach of the state, such as
individual religiosity or partner
relationships. In combination
with the clear political emphasis
on welfare policies, this has
resulted in fewer discussions
about pro-birth policies during
the past 15–30 years.
On the empirical side, there are
only a few clear cases from
Socialist countries, e.g. the 1976
pro-birth measures taken in
Eastern Germany. They are
estimated to have increased
fertility by about 20 percent,
partly due to the fact that having
a child was the only way for
young women and men to get
an apartment of their own.
However, this only worked in
the absence of an open housing
market.
Many of the studies analysing
the temporal correlation
between policy measures and
fertility rates face the meth-
odological problem that sudden
policy changes are rare and
numerous other fertility
determinants are changing at the
same time. This makes it
difficult to pin down the specific
contribution of the policy
change. Only when a sharp
timing of the policy and the
response is possible do such
associations become rather
unambiguous. An example of a
negative association of this sort
could recently be observed in
Austria. In the course of the
budget consolidation in late
1996, a long-established cash
payment (of ATS 15,000; Euro
1,090) granted at each birth was
abolished as of January 1997.
This was extensively covered in
the media in late 1996. Monthly
birth rates in 1997 remained at
After two decades of family policy aiming at lower fertility—the
“stop at two” policy—Singapore took a rather sharp turn in the
mid-1980s and announced in 1987, “Have three or more, if you
can afford it”. At that point, the total fertility rate had fallen to
1.62. The main concerns were with population ageing in general,
and the fact that especially the better-educated women had fewer
children. The latter was assumed to have negative impacts on
human capital formation and the abilities of future generations
as children of educated mothers tend to have a better education.
After some controversy, the benefits were not only granted to
educated but to all women. They comprised (a) financial incen-
tives, including tax rebates, for third and fourth children; (b)
child-care subsidies and other measures to facilitate the reconci-
liation of work and family; and (c) priority in the allocation of
new homes. These measures were accompanied by a presumably
rather effective image campaign on childbearing.
In the next three years, the fertility rate increased by 15 percent.
The increase was particularly pronounced for third births, which
almost doubled between 1986 and 1990. Recently, the govern-
ment has launched a new campaign to lower the mean age at
marriage. It remains to be seen whether these measures will be
equally successful.
A View to Asia:
Singapore Family Policies
an
Govern-
ment Policies
Influence Fertility
and Should They 
Do So?
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their previous average level
(total fertility rate around 1.4)
until August/September; in
October 1997 they fell by about
ten percent and have remained
at that lower level ever since
(most recent data for mid-1998).
Although there seems to be little
doubt about this particular
timing, it is of course unclear
whether this will be a temporary
or a lasting effect.
The most comprehensive study
on the impact of financial
benefits granted to families in
Western Europe was published
by Gauthier and Hatzius in
1997. It is based on econometric
time-series methods applied to
22 industrialised countries for
the period 1970–1990. The study
indicates that a 25-percent
increase in family allowances
would increase fertility by an
average of four percent, or 0.07
children per woman. The
authors call it a modest but
statistically significant effect.
Given the present restricted
budgetary situations in most
industrialised countries, it seems
rather unlikely that financial
incentives of such a magnitude
could be provided that they
would bring fertility back up to
replacement level. But perhaps
finances are less important than
other non-monetary incentives
(see box: A View to Asia:
Singapore Family Policies).
Public concern about low
fertility seems to be reaching a
new phase. In many European
countries, period fertility has
now been below replacement for
a quarter of a century and
expectations that it might
recover by itself are diminishing.
It is not even clear whether we
have already reached the bottom
of the curve (see box: How Low
Can Fertility Go?). Moreover,
migration, which has always
been in the back of our mind as
a possible remedy against too
rapid ageing, seems to be less of
a viable option these days when
immigration policies tend to
become much more restrictive.
Finally, the expected dis-
continuity and the ensuing
serious problems in the pension
system expected to occur with
the retirement of the baby-boom
generation are only two to three
decades ahead so preventive
measures must be taken soon.
At the European level, the issue
of population ageing is now
widely discussed. A series of
high-level conferences, as well as
extensive media coverage, have
once more focused the public
awareness on this issue. At
present, Greece is the EU
Member State with the most
pronounced concern about low
fertility. The concern about low
and further-decreasing fertility
seems to go across the entire
political spectrum. This may
also be connected with rapid
population growth in
neighbouring countries. In
Greece, pro-birth policies are
considered the only option and
should include direct as well as
indirect effects on family size. At
the European level, there was no
clear correlation between the
level of fertility in a country and
its concern about low fertility
during the 1980s (France was
the country most concerned
despite its relatively high fertility
rates). However, now such a
correlation seems to prevail. In
the UK, Ireland and the Nordic
countries, where fertility is
relatively high, concern seems to
be the lowest; whereas in
Southern Europe, where fertility
is at very low levels, concern
seems to be rapidly increasing. 
In this connection, two
important questions have to be
asked:
• Can public policies influence
fertility levels, and what kinds of
measures tend to have what
kinds of effects under different
conditions?
• If yes, are such policy
measures desirable under
different criteria of social equity,
gender and intergenerational
equity, and the human-rights
view according to which the
decision to have children is
largely considered a private
matter?
Both questions have not yet
found sufficient answers in
Europe. The first question is of
an empirical and scientific
nature and needs increased
attention by European scholars
specialising on family, popu-
lation and public policy. The
second question is largely a
political issue that will have to
be discussed extensively at
different political levels. How-
ever, a rational discussion of the
second question will depend on
the kind of answer that scientists
give to the first question, as well
as on how scientists assess the
expected consequences of
continued low fertility. Scientists
should get to work quickly to be
able to present some evidence
when the political question will
inevitably heat up.
Wolfgang Lutz
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Even if fertility rates remain at their present low levels, Europe’s
population will only shrink very slowly. Assuming that fertility
and mortality remain constant and there is no net migration, i.e.
no increase due to migration, the 375 million inhabitants of the
European Union will have shrunk to 298 millions by the year
2050. Projections for the more distant future yield a population
of 186 million people (around half the present population) for
2100. The population will have decreased to 75 millions (less
than a quarter) by 2200, to 30 millions by 2300, to 12 millions by
2400, and to less than 5 million people by 2500. If you do not
stop the computer, you will learn that there will be just around
50,000 Europeans in the year 3000. Of course, this is an unre-
alistic and absolutely hypothetical projection!
It Will Take Some Time before 
Europe Dies Out
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A
t first glance,
one would
assume that
the whole
issue of
reconciling
family and work was predomi-
nantly about children. However,
a closer inspection shows that a
childhood and/or children’s
perspective is generally missing
in the debate. If at all, children
are seen as objects and obstacles
rather than as subjects and as a
population group with its own
needs and expectations. The
tasks of child care and of
balancing family and work
cannot be entirely left to parents
(who are more or less willing to
share responsibilities between
them) or to employers (who
may or may not establish a
family-friendly work environ-
ment). These tasks also have to
be approached at the socio-
political level. The issue of
reconciling family and work
thus not only concerns the very
central parts of both the gender
and generational contracts, but
is also crucial for the state
versus the individual or family
compact.
H
Contrary to widespread
perceptions of family erosion
and instability, childhood in
Western countries is seen as
family childhood. In a historical
perspective, countries like
Austria have never before had
such a high percentage of
children who lived in a family
arrangement. According to
Austrian statistics, 99 percent of
children live in some kind of
family, be it a traditional
nuclear family, a single-parent
family, a reconstituted or any
other type of family. From the
remaining one percent, the
majority, i.e. 0.6 percent, lives
with a foster family; only 0.4
percent live in some kind of
residential institution. This
development is connected to a
widespread belief that a family
or family-like arrangement is
the best environment for raising
a child, as compared to a
children’s home or similar
institution. Simultaneously with
this ongoing de-institutional-
isation of childhood, we can
also observe a growing level of
institutionalisation: Children
The reconcili-
ation of family
and work is one of the great chal-
lenges in Europe. There are intensive
debates about the role of fathers and
mothers, employees and employers.
But who listens to the children?
Childhood perspective
Helmut Wintersberger
Work Viewed 
from a Childhood
Perspective
istori-
cal
Perspective:
Two Child-care
Revolutions
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spend more hours and years in
school than before. In addition,
an increasing percentage of
children are enrolled in day-care
centres, crèches and extra-
curricular activities.
For American society, Don
Hernandez has identified two
child-care revolutions: The
transition from the two-parent
farm family to the father-
breadwinner/mother-
homemaker family brought
about the first child-care
revolution. The father’s daily
exit from home to work became
socially accepted. At the same
time, going to school became an
obligation for children.
The second child-care revolution
set in when the model of the
dual-earner family gained
ground. After the father, the
mother also left the home.
Hernandez argues that this
second child-care revolution
actually created the need for
day-care for pre-school children.
In a gender perspective, one has
to critically remark that con-
cerns were not raised with a
view to the first child-care revol-
ution, which is connected with
fathers’ participation in the
labour market. However, the
advantages and disadvantages of
working mothers are still heavily
debated. Yet these concerns are
mainly due to male resistance to
contributing a fair share to
household and child-care work.
T
Developments in the United
States can never be directly
applied to Europe. Yet, on the
whole, the fundamental pattern
of changes concerning family
formations and child care is
rather similar: The ageing of
society, the current pluralisation
of family patterns, such changes
on the labour market as
increasing female employment,
and threatening unemployment
are only a few examples.
However, regarding child-care
services, the perception of
trends and solution of problems
varies between, and sometimes
even within countries. This can
partly be explained by the
different concepts regarding the
tasks of child-care facilities.
Some consider child day-care an
educational institution; for
others, it is a care service; and a
third group defines it as a place
where children can display their
creative potential. One aspect,
however, is similar all over
Europe: Child-care facilities are
not considered as important as,
for example, the question of
how to finance the pension
system or how to reduce
unemployment.
Coherent and comprehensive
solutions are only found in the
Nordic countries, i.e. in Den-
mark, Finland and Sweden.
Differently from Sweden, where
the preference is exclusively on
day-care facilities, the Finnish
model combines coherent,
comprehensive solutions with
flexibility. Sirpa Taskinen
reports, “One of the parents can
lengthen her/his leave until the
child is three years old without
losing a job. Parents of young
children are entitled to shorten
working hours to six hours a day
or 30 hours a week, until the
end of the year in which the
child starts school. Both parents
must be in gainful employment
and only one of them can apply.
Parents of children under three
can apply for a partial home-
care allowance to cover the
reduction of income.”
In Europe, common statutory
leave arrangements for workers
with children comprise ma-
ternity leave, paternity leave,
parental leave, and leave for
family reasons. All Member
States make some provision for
post-natal leave: The period
varies between 8 and 18 weeks.
In most Member States, mothers
receive between 70 and 100
percent of their normal
earnings. An exception is the
UK, where post-natal leave may
last up to 29 weeks, but most of
it is either paid at a low flat rate
or unpaid.
Variety increases if we turn our
attention to the other leave
arrangements. Only the Nordic
countries introduced a right to a
paternity leave of at least two
weeks. A few more countries
have provisions foreseeing two
to three days’ leave for fathers at
the time of birth. The picture is
From the single individual’s point of view, childhood is a transi-
ent phase. From the point of view of society, childhood is a time-
less phenomenon. This simply means that childhood is a necess-
ary constituent of every society. The population group of chil-
dren keeps changing: Children grow up and leave the group,
while newborn children continuously join it. Childhood also
changes in the course of history and differs between countries
and continents.
For this reason, social scientists no longer limit their studies of
children’s life situations to comparisons between children of dif-
ferent ages and sexes or from different social classes. In a grow-
ing number of studies, they contrast the situation of children
with that of adults and that of elderly persons.
What Is Childhood?
he
European
Perspective:
Common Questions,
Different Answers “
“The present distribution of working
time over the life cycle is a lucid 
example of society’s disregard for
children and families.”
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equally heterogeneous con-
cerning parental leave. The
arrangements differ widely as to
their length: from two months to
three years. Yet another dif-
ference is the financial com-
pensation and the choice
between either taking leave in
one block or splitting it up into
several periods. Leave for family
reasons, e.g. in case the children
are ill, is guaranteed in eight
Member States. The most
generous entitlements are
granted in Germany and
Sweden.
All Member States provide
publicly-funded child-care
services, but the levels of pro-
vision for different age groups
show a wide variance. For
children aged 0 to 3 years,
coverage varies between 2 and
48 percent; for children aged 3
to 6 years, between 48 and 99
percent; and for children aged 6
to 10 years, between 0 and 62
percent. 
There is some convergence with
regard to care for children aged
3–6 years, but obviously not
with regard to children aged 0–3
and school children under 10.
The reports of the Childcare
Network also reveal remarkable
differences concerning access,
payment, curricula, opening
hours, flexibility, and quality of
services. In Anglo-Saxon
countries, publicly-funded day-
care institutions primarily serve
low-income families. In other
countries, the right to day-care is
a universal right, either free of
charge or for a subsidised fee
that may be the same for every
child or depend on the family
income. In some countries, child
care is understood and organ-
ised as an educational service; 
in others, as a social service. In
many places, day-care centres
are open only in the morning,
but there is a visible trend
towards full-time day-care. In
Austria and Germany, most
primary schools work only in
the mornings, so that there
exists a particular care problem
for young schoolchildren in the
afternoon.
D
While recent recommendations
of the European Parliament, as
well as of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of
Europe, predominantly address
children as subjects, this was
originally not the case for the
various initiatives of the Euro-
pean Council and the European
Commission. Meanwhile, a
tendency to recognise children
as citizens of Europe can also be
observed there. Additional
momentum was generated by
the Treaty of Amsterdam,
which introduced age as a
criterion of discrimination.
The UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child, on the one
hand, demonstrates very well
the tension between the different
dimensions of rights and
responsibilities of society, the
family and the individual.
Article 18, which relates to child
care, points out that caring for
children is in principle a joint
parental responsibility, and that
society has to support parents in
the performance of this task by
developing adequate child-care
facilities. On the other hand, by
restricting the right to day-care
to children of working parents,
Article 18 is one of the sections
of the Convention which
obviously does not correspond
to the main philosophy of
recognising children as subjects
and citizens. Strictly speaking, a
right granted to children of
Provision of Publicly-funded Services 
in Member States
Key:
* The figures in this column do not include children in
compulsory schooling; the data are confined to services
providing care and recreation to school-aged children.
(a) Figure includes some children in compulsory schooling
(i.e. where compulsory schooling begins before 6).
?? No information.
?<5% No information, but under 5 percent.
? Approximate figure.
# Greece, the Netherlands and the UK do not produce 
statistics for children aged 0–3 and 3–6: In Greece, 
statistics are for children aged 0–2.5–5 years; in the
Netherlands, for children aged 0–4 years; in the UK, for
children aged 0–5 years.
In nearly all cases, ‘publicly-funded’ means that more
than half of the total costs of a service are paid from
public sources, usually between 75 percent and 100 per-
cent. The main exception to this are the Netherlands,
where public funding usually covers less than half the
costs of services in the welfare system.
Member Age at which Provision in publicly-funded services
State compulsory for children aged (years):
schooling begins
0–3 3–6 6–10 *
Austria 6 3% 75% 6%
Belgium 6 30% 95%+ ??
Denmark 7 48% 82% 62% + all 
6 year olds in 
pre-primary 
education
Finland 7 21% 53% 5%+60% of 6 
year olds in 
welfare and 
education 
system services
France 6 23% 99% ?30%
Germany 6 2% (W) 78% (W) 5% (W)
50% (O) 100% (O) 88% (O)
Greece 6 #3% #70% (a) ?<5%
Ireland 6 2% 55% ?<5%
Italy 6 6% 91% ??
Netherlands 5 #8% (a) #71% (a) ?<5%
Portugal 6 12% 48% 10%
Spain 6 ?2% 84% ??
Sweden 7 33% 72% 64% + some 6
year olds in 
pre-primary 
schooling
UK 5 2% #60% (a) ??<5%
Source: European Commission Network on Childcare and Other Measures to
Reconcile Employment and Family Responsibilities (ed.) (1996): A Review of
Services For Young Children in the European Union 1990–1995. Luxembourg:
European Commission Directorate General V. (The source table does not contain
data on Luxembourg.)
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working parents is not a child’s
right but a right of working
parents. This is underlined by a
comparison with Article 28 of
the Convention, inviting states
to “recognise the right of the
child to education” and in
particular to make “primary
education compulsory and
available free to all”. This is
clearly an obligation and a right
assigned directly to children
regardless of the employment
(or any other) status of their
parents.
That this criticism with regard
to Article 18 of the UN Con-
vention on the Rights of the
Child is not mere legal hair-
splitting, is underlined by
experiences reported from
Sweden, a country that takes the
implementation of the Con-
vention very seriously. However,
in doing so, a number of local
authorities have obviously also
taken seriously the limitation
contained in Article 18.
Ulla Björnberg reports that, due
to fiscal constraints, about half
of the local authorities have
reduced the right to child care
when one parent is unemployed.
Some Swedish local authorities
admit children with an
unemployed parent only for
three hours a day. Totally or
partly excluding children with
an unemployed parent from
child care may correspond to the
letter of Article 18. Never-
theless, it constitutes a clear
violation of Article 2 of the
Convention, according to which
no child should be discriminated
against, irrespective of the
child’s or his or her parent’s
race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other
opinion, national, ethnic or
social origin, property, disability,
birth or other status.
S
Space and Time for
Young Children
In a traditional understanding of
child care, care is seen as a one-
sided phenomenon of adults
(parents or child professionals)
taking care of children. At first
sight, this seems obvious: Small
children cannot look after
themselves. Nevertheless, we
should reflect on how much of
children’s need for care is
socially determined. While there
has always been some need for
the care of small children in any
society, the great extent of child
care required in modern society
is connected with the peculi-
arities of this very society.
Children are kept in special
reserves, at home or in child-
care centres. Their mobility is
restricted so that they will
survive modern traffic. On the
one hand, the concept of
modern child care seems to be
based on the view that young
children are like aliens who have
to be socialised. On the other 
hand, there is the idea of
creating and extending spaces
for young children. By reinte-
grating the needs of young
children, society would increas-
ingly readapt itself not only to
children’s but also to human
needs in general.
Urban planners and architects
increasingly envisage large areas
where modern traffic does not
impose its logic on people, but
has to adapt to the pace of
human beings—young children
included. A space for young
children may, however, not only
be understood in the physical
sense, but also in a qualitative
sense as a place where “children
should be entitled to be creative
children in their own right”, as
the Swedish expert Ulla
Björnberg puts it.
Another aspect is time. The
discrepancy between children’s
subjective time perception and
their subordination under a
‘linear’ time regime is quite
evident. While this rigid time
regime was necessary to achieve
material development through-
out the industrial revolution, its
rationality is questionable in
post-industrial societies.
How is paid work distributed
over the life cycle? Education
finishes later, and entry into the
labour market—as well as the
attainment of financial inde-
pendence—are deferred. The
age of marriage has increased,
and women have their first child
at a later age. However, there is
one exception to this trend,
namely the age at which
people—and in particular
men—leave the labour market.
The modern life cycle is
characterised by three more or
less equally long periods: A
formative stage of approxi-
mately 25 years, an ‘active’ stage
of approximately 30 years, and
an ‘inactive’ stage of approxi-
mately 25 years. Raising the
current pension age has been
discussed time and again, but
this does not alter the fact that
the labour market hardly offers
any jobs for this population
group.
Another contradiction concerns
the increasing coincidence
between working and child-
rearing years. Postponing the
employment of the young, early
retirement for older people, and
the growing participation of
women in the labour force have
all brought a concentration of
work during the ‘prime working
age’, i.e. between the ages of 25
and 50 years. In EU Member
States in 1994, people of prime
working age accounted for
hardly more than half of the
working-age population; how-
ever, they constituted two thirds
of the population actually
working. The prime working age
group is thus overrepresented in
the group of people who
actually work. At the same time,
these years of the life cycle
coincide with the most import-
ant years for forming a family
and raising children. If we do“
“Fewer structural constraints for 
families could improve equal 
opportunities for women, men 
and children.”
ugges-
tions for
a Child-centred
Approach to
Reconciliation
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not want to impede child-
bearing, it is obvious that the
overall work load should be
redistributed over the life cycle.
Moreover, parental child care
has to be complemented by
additional (professional or non-
professional), high-quality care
facilities.
The present distribution of
working time over the life cycle
is a lucid example of society’s
disregard for children and
families. There are biological
(and social) limits to shifting
reproduction in either direction.
Along with a reduction of
working time during the prime
age, one could also envisage an
extension of working time in the
years preceding and following
the prime age. In this way,
young people would be inte-
grated earlier into employment,
and the actual age of retirement
would be deferred.
Child Care and Gender
Policies: Reducing the
Gender Bias in Child
Care
Regarding labour-market
participation in the European
Union, fathers emerge in first
place, followed by childless men,
childless women, and finally by
mothers. Around 70 percent of
all men of employable age are
actually employed; the corres-
ponding percentage for women,
however, is only 50 percent. In
addition, more women work
part-time than men, the result of
which is that women’s share in
the total volume of paid work is
barely more than one third.
It is, however, more interesting
to study the gender pattern of
labour-market participation in
relation to the presence of
children in the family. While
fathers are more likely to
participate in the labour force
than are childless men, mothers
are less likely to do so than are
childless women. Data from the
UK demonstrate that this
reversal is particularly ac-
centuated for more qualified
positions: Two thirds of women
managers are childless, while
two thirds of men managers
have children.
There could be different inter-
pretations for this phenomenon.
A possible explanation is that a
cultural process of gender
assimilation has already come to
some fruition in the case of
childless persons. Women are
more work-oriented than they
used to be, while men are less
work-oriented than before: This
has reduced the gap in work
orientation between women and
men. Why does this cultural
achievement vanish once we
turn our attention to fathers and
mothers? As a consequence of
society’s structural indifference
or hostility towards children,
families with children experi-
ence additional constraints and
pressures, both in terms of
finances and time. In order to be
competitive with childless
households, households with
children have to increase their
efficiency. To the extent that
men are more ‘efficient’ in
earning money and women in
caring for children, it becomes
economically rational to special-
ise, i.e. men dedicate themselves
to work and women to child
care.
These male and female
‘efficiencies’ are not natural.
They are socially transmitted
through gender relations. If this
interpretation is correct, and if
we want to change gender
relations not only for childless
couples but also for parents
(who transmit gender per-
ceptions to the next generation),
it will not suffice merely to
appeal to fathers and mothers.
Pressures and constraints
affecting households with
children will have to be
eliminated by a combination of
additional financial benefits,
child-care services, and suf-
ficient time for mothers and
fathers to take care of their
children.
Child Care and the
Generational Contract
In traditional society, it was
obvious to perceive children as
an investment in one’s own
future, in particular with regard
to security in old age. Along
with the process of modern-
isation, children have in-
creasingly lost their para-
mount function for income
maintenance in old age. In the
public perception, this role has
been taken over by the welfare
state. After the Second World
War, the expansion of welfare
states as well as the development
of social security systems—and
in particular of old-age pen-
sions—were facilitated by both
economic and population
growth. As long as both trends
prevailed, it was feasible to pay
increasing pensions to a growing
number of pensioners. This has
created the illusion of secure
and foreseeable pension entitle-
ments accruing after decades,
which would somehow depend
on the income level and the
duration of working life in line
with the respective social
security regulations.
However, in the majority of the
Member States, public pension
schemes operate on the principle
that they more or less spend on
old-age pensions what they
collect from workers in the
current year. In an ageing
society, this will obviously lead
to problems and tensions when
a shrinking active workforce will
have to pay an increasing part of
their salary for a growing popu-
lation of elderly persons. One
could argue that the principle of
social pension insurance could
be changed, and national
pension funds could be obliged
to accumulate material value to
allow them to maintain their
commitments irrespective of
In the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 18
especially relates to caring for children, which is considered the
common responsibility of both parents. Society is to assist them
in this task by providing adequate institutions, facilities and 
services for child care. In particular, children of working parents
should have the right to benefit from such institutions.
In Recommendation 1286 (1996) of the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe on a European Strategy for Children,
states are urged ”to guarantee to all children the right to free and
high-quality education for pre-school, primary and secondary
education”. Contrary to the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child, right of access to pre-school institutions is not limited to
children of working parents.
At the level of the European Union, the Council Recommen-
dation of 31 March 1992 on Child Care lists four relevant areas
for initiatives that should enable parents to fulfil their vocational,
familial and educational obligations: child-care services; leave
arrangements for working parents; workplaces responsive to the
needs of workers with children; and increased participation of
fathers in child care.
Legal Documents at the International 
and European Levels
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demographic developments.
However, the principle of the
unity of the social budget
stipulates otherwise: any social
benefits—and in particular,
transfer payments to such
members of the non-working
population as children and
elderly persons—have to be
deducted from the income of
the working population, on the
basis of either an explicit or an
implicit generational contract.
During the transition from
traditional to modern society,
the principle of intergener-
ational solidarity has been
retained. It was simply trans-
ferred from the level of the
extended family to society. In
modern society, the generational
contract is based on the reci-
procity of a generation of par-
ents who cared for the gener-
ation of their children, who will
in turn care for their aged par-
ents’ generation when they
become adults. Strictly speaking,
contributions to pension in-
surance are therefore not to be
considered as a contribution to
one’s own pension but rather to
that of one’s parents. Only
expenditures for children (for
one’s own children as well as
contributions to a public family
allowance fund) may be con-
sidered a contribution to one’s
own pension. It is therefore
necessary to analyse the existing
social security regulations, their
underlying normative values,
and their implications for
income distribution over the life
cycle with regard to distributive
justice for families, genders and
generations.
From a family-centred point of
view, it is obvious that parents
invest quite a lot in their
children, both in cash and in
care. But what about society?
Public pension schemes really
do not favour those who bring
up children, but rather those
who care predominantly about
their own career. At the in-
dividual level, it is perfectly
rational to live without children
and to optimise active income
and pension entitlements. At the
level of society, the aggregation
of these individual approaches
may turn out to be problematic
with regard to demographic
development, distributive justice,
and the viability of public
pension schemes.
This is also confirmed by a
gender-specific analysis. Under
the logic of present social
security regulations, men—who
mostly concentrate on their
career—get much higher pen-
sions than women, who usually
invest much more in their
children. From a child-centred
perspective, the generational
contract has to be extended and
revised. 
Usually, the generational
contract is interpreted as a
contract between only two
generations, i.e. the ‘active’
population of employable age
and the population of the aged.
This contract has to be redefined
as a contract between three gen-
erations, namely children and
youth, working-age adults, and
senior citizens.
Child Care and 
Quality Issues
The EU publication on the
reconciliation of work and
family life (see box: Sources)
shows that quality is the most
important but least researched
problem in child care. Quality of
care is important, first of all, in
an egalitarian perspective.
Labour-market promotion
should not be achieved at the
expense of child welfare.
Gender equity also requires
high-quality care, because both
social pressure and personal
loyalty may result in women’s
leaving work if services are
unsatisfactory. The opposite is
also true: An infrastructure
providing good care services is
one factor in promoting female
employment. This is clearly
underlined by higher female
labour-force rates in the Nordic
countries.
To the extent that there are
quantitative studies on supply
and demand of child-care
services, as far as quality is
touched upon, the analysis is
usually restricted to such
structural aspects as budgets,
rooms, equipment, opening
hours, or the number of children
per teacher. With a view to
processes and interactions, the
quality of child care is difficult
to examine and measure. The
first question to be asked is,
“Whose perspective is im-
portant?” The perspective of
parents, that of teachers, or that
of children? Children are usually
the last to be asked. Decision-
makers and experts often resort
to the prejudice that it is simply
too difficult to interview young
children.
High quality child-care services
require children’s participation.
There is evidence of the
successful implementation of
their participation in issues
regarding their own care in such
countries as Denmark. In
Sweden, severe financial
constraints have forced day-care
centres to negotiate a care
contract with the parents. Ulla
Björnberg thinks that the
contract “which is set between
the child-care centre and the
parents at the beginning of the
semester, creates inflexibility for
parents who might have to work
overtime. These strategies are
adult-centred in the sense that
they focus on costs and fees and
not on the needs of adapting
work and child care.”
The writer agrees with Ulla
Björnberg that the Swedish
child-care contract in its present
form is too inflexible and, on
the whole, shortsighted. In
principle, he could imagine a
different type of child-care
contract, namely one that would
have to be extended to quality
issues (and not just opening
hours), and include children
themselves as third partners in
the negotiation process—
because young children also
have their rights and duties.
S
If children are to be addressed
as subjects, this presupposes a
child-centred discourse on
reconciliation, in which the
interests of children have to be
prioritised and care for young
children is to be seen as a task
just as important as any other
tasks in the economy and/or
ummary 
and Conclusions
“„Public pension schemes favour people without children.“
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society. At the conceptual level,
the notion of the welfare mix
may prove instrumental in many
ways. In particular, the
following arguments suggest
introducing it into the child-care
debate.
• The welfare mix concept may
be understood as being
synonymous with welfare
pluralism, acknowledging the
relevance of the state, the
market, the voluntary sector and
the family for the total welfare
of the population. With a view
to child-care policies, this could
mean shifting the family’s care
monopoly towards a more
balanced mix of resources in
order to reduce the pressure on
parents (and especially on
mothers) and to improve the
wellbeing of children.
• The concept of the welfare mix
could be understood as a tool for
an inclusive and comprehensive
discourse, instrumental in
combining the main ideological
orientations. While Conservatives
will tend to emphasise the role
of the family, Liberals that of
the market, and Labour that of
the public sector, they all may
agree on the fundamental
principle that any solutions for
meeting children’s needs have to
be found somewhere in the area
circumscribed by the welfare
triangle of market, state and
household. The welfare-mix
concept provides tools that also
allow for identifying and
locating intermediate solutions
and organisations, such as
service co-operatives or self-help
groups, on the map of social
and child-care services.
• The concept of the welfare
mix could be utilised to not only
make the gaps in child-care
policies visible, but to also deal
with them. This presupposes
that parents (and children) are
permitted to identify their own
strategy, and to combine
financial child-care benefits with
the level of employment they
consider appropriate. The
concept of choice is often used
in a way complementary to
competition. This holds true in
particular for choices of the
‘either-or’ type. Existing
regulations sometimes do not
offer any choices to parents at
all (e.g. only parental leave but
no child-care services or vice
versa); or else they give parents
a choice between undesirable
alternatives (either a low
parental leave benefit or full-
time work). Such regulations are
hardly geared to the needs of
the people, but rather to ‘visions’
of (male) politicians who are
not familiar with the reality of
family life.
• From a child-centred point of
view, the welfare-mix concept is
relatively neutral in relation to
different stakeholder groups. It
allows children to be included as
both subjects and partners in the
process of identifying, nego-
tiating and implementing the
reconciliation programmes and
child-care services that have a
direct bearing on their life.
At the pragmatic level, the Co-
ordinator of the European
Observatory on Family Matters,
Helmut Wintersberger, argues
for 
• a different distribution of
working time over the life cycle; 
• reducing pressures and
constraints specifically affecting
families with children; 
• improving the recognition of
child-care activities in pension
insurance, and recognising
children as partners in the
tripartite generational contract;
• developing and implementing
coherent, comprehensive child-
care policies; and
• promoting children’s par-
ticipation as early as pre-school
age as a prerequisite for assess-
ing the quality of services from
a child-centred perspective.
On the whole, the failure of
European societies to suc-
cessfully combine economic
development with conditions for
a good family life—as the basic
prerequisite of biological and
social renovation—is a sign of a
society more careless than
caring, operating mainly at the
expense of both children and
their mothers. At the same time,
however, it constitutes an
obstacle to international com-
petitiveness in the economic
sense. In the long run, the
implementation of successful
models of reconciling family
and work will be more im-
portant for Europe’s economic
performance than improving 
the main traffic connections in
Europe—though this issue is
much closer to European
politicians’ hearts. All over
Europe, there are heated debates
about work, and the battle
against unemployment is a
priority topic. This might be the
point to engage in a comprehen-
sive discussion on the concept of
work: What is work? How do
we define paid v. unpaid work?
Which kind of work is valuable
from whose point of view? How
do we define socially valuable
work? Who does what kind of
work? Who gets which type of
financial and social-security
compensation? Questions
abound. We have to ask who
will answer them and what will
happen with the answers.
Looking back from a family
perspective on the first decade of
the European Observatory on
Family Matters, it can be said
that we have already learned a
lot, though there is still much to
be done.
This article is predominantly based on three information and
data sources:
First, it draws on the results obtained in the international re-
search project Childhood as a Social Phenomenon (Qvortrup, J.
et al. (eds.) (1994): Childhood Matters. Aldershot: Avebury).
Second, mention should be made of the work done by the
European Commission’s Network on Childcare and Other
Measures to Reconcile Employment and Family Responsibilities.
Peter Moss directed this network, which was the competent body
at EU level to systematically collect information and data up to
1995.
The third main source is the report Reconciliation of Work and
Family Life for Men and Women and the Quality of Care
Services – Report on Existing Research in the European Union.
It was also written by members of the Childcare Network men-
tioned above and published by the European Commission 
(DG V/D/5, ISBN 92-828.6184-8) in 1999.
Sources
Helmut Wintersberger
European Observatory on Family
Matters
Austrian Institute for Family Studies
Gonzagagasse 19/9
A-1010 Vienna, Austria
phone: +43-1-535 14 54 27
fax: +43-1-535 14 55
e-mail: helmut.wintersberger@oif.ac.at
website:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg05/
family/observatory/home.html
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Societal and Business-level
Efforts to Promote the Family
Living Arrangements
In 1998, Austria registered a total of 81,233
births, i.e. an average of 1.34 children per
woman. This is the lowest rate ever recorded in
Austria and means that just 66 percent of the
current generation of parents is being
‘replaced’ by a generation of children. Young
people postpone starting families, young
couples frequently cohabit without marrying,
and there are more singles. Nevertheless, even
among the young, only a minority shows a
decided preference for remaining single.
The facts provide clear evidence that
partnership, marriage and family are still the
paramount living arrangements chosen by
Austrians. In 1997, there were 2.24 million
nuclear families in Austria, i.e. (married)
couples with or without one or more child/ren
and lone parents with one or more child/ren.
Of these, two out of three family households
(64 percent or 1.44 million) consisted of
families with child/ren living in the same
household. Thus, a change can be
observed, even though it is not
radical enough to speak of a
genuine break with past trends. One of the
most statistically significant changes is the
marked increase in the number of parents in
the ‘empty-nest phase’ (who, for statistical
purposes, are counted as childless).
Family Policies
The early 1990s saw an extension of family
benefits: A second year of parental leave was
introduced and the family allowance was
raised. However, benefits were at least partially
curtailed in 1995 and again in 1996 in the
course of two austerity programmes launched
by the government. The families were the only
group that suffered cuts in real terms, to the
tune of ATS 3 billion (Euro 218 million).
Nevertheless, a new family package that will
first come into full effect in 2000 will more
than compensate for these cutbacks. It was
passed in response to a ruling by the
Constitutional Court in 1997 requiring that the
tax system take more account of the child-
maintenance obligation.
There has been an ongoing and intense
discussion of how to assist parents with small
children. Based on a feasibility study of a
proposed child-care-voucher system presented
by the Austrian Institute for Family Studies,
politicians are discussing a range of schemes
(parental leave benefit for all mothers, a three-
year child-care benefit, means-tested parental
leave benefit). A key point of the dispute is
whether the parental leave benefit should
continue to be linked to unemployment
insurance or whether it should be granted to
all parents as a type of basic income for a
specific life phase, regardless of whether or not
they have been previously employed.
Reconciling Family and Work 
Discussions in this context involve company
facilities for child care, family-friendly working
hours, schemes to help parents return to their
job after taking a baby break, etc. As the
responsible authority, the Ministry of
Environment, Youth and Family Affairs, in 
co-operation with the business community, has
introduced a Family & Work Audit that allows
companies to review their pro-family activities
within the scope of an additional module for
ISO certification. 
Combating Sexual Abuse
Over the past few years, public discussion in
Belgium has been dominated by the Dutroux
case, which has developed into a full-fledged
debate on child sexual abuse. Discoveries of
irregularities in the operation of the judicial
system have led to more stringent laws against
white slavery and child pornography. This
crackdown included extensive campaigns to
report family rape and child prostitution, as
well as the establishment of special counselling
centres. Belgium also took the initiative at the
European level, proposing, inter alia, that
Austria
Austrian Institute for Family Studies
Gonzagagasse 19/8, A-1010 Vienna
phone: +43-1-535 14 54 18
fax: +43-1-535 14 55
e-mail: helmuth.schattovits@oif.ac.at
website: http://www.oif.ac.at/
Helmuth SCHATTOVITS
national expert
Helmuth Schattovits heads the Austrian
Institute for Family Studies, which has co-
ordinated the European Observatory on
Family Matters since 1998.
Belgium
flashlights
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Europol should be granted more authority in
the fight against child sexual abuse. The
French-speaking community appointed the
Délégué Général de la Communauté Française
aux Droits de l’Enfant (General Delegate of
the French-speaking Community for the
Rights of the Child) (1991/1997); the Dutch-
speaking community founded the Com-
missariat of Juvenile Court Judges
(1997/1999). Of even greater importance was
the formation of Child Focus, the European
Centre for Missing and Sexually Exploited
Children, a non-profit organisation of
international dimensions.
Government Financial 
Policies for Families
Because of the federal structure of Belgium,
family policy is a regional competence, while
the financial side is regulated at the federal
level. Due to this split, it is difficult to provide
any genuinely comprehensive survey. Under
pressure to meet the Maastricht criteria, the
Belgian government implemented measures at
the expenditure and financing sides; never-
theless, these failed to cause any fundamental
change in the situation of families. Salaries
and benefits were indexed to the inflation rate,
which meant that child benefits were raised by
two percent.
Demography
Demographic developments in
Belgium are similar to those
prevailing across Europe:
• declining birth rates
(presently 1.13 children
per woman);
• a decline in marriage rates
by 1.1 percent in 1994–1995,
coinciding with a rise in the
likelihood of divorce;
• a tendency towards marrying later: for men,
at an average age of just below 30; and for
women, just after their 31st birthday.
Family Structure
Dual-income households continue to be the
chief family type in Belgium, but the
percentage of single-earner households is
growing steadily. The proportion of children 
in households headed by a single wage-earner
rose from 5.6 percent in 1985 to 8.8 percent in
1992. The number of children living in poor
lone-parent households, on the other hand,
declined during that period. There are a
number of factors to explain this improve-
ment: not only a rise in the subsistence
minimum for this group, but also a marked
increase in the number of lone parents
pursuing some gainful employment.
Reconciling Family and Work
In 1996, a Royal Decision was approved to
extend the types of career breaks available. Up
till then, full- and half-time career breaks were
possible. The new Decision introduces new
forms of part-time career breaks in addition to
the existing ones: 1/5, 1/4 and 1/3 career
breaks are now possible. The monthly career
break allowance has also been increased
provided the break is taken within three years
of the birth of the second or subsequent 
child. 
In Belgium, two
magazines—a Dutch
weekly and a French biweekly—
deal with a large range of family issues,
including school or youth unemploy-
ment. For more information, contact:
Bond van Grote en van Jonge 
Gezinnen (BGJG)
Troonstraat 125
B–1050 Brussels, Belgium
phone: +32-2-507 88 77
e-mail: bgjg.studie@village.uunet.be
Ligue des familles
127 rue du Trone
B–1050 Brussels, Belgium
phone: +32-2-507 72 11
Faculteit Sociale Wetenschappen
Departement Sociologie
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
E. van Evenstraat 2b, B-3000 Leuven
phone: +32-16-32 31 88 or +32-16-32 31 87
fax: +32-16-32 33 65
e-mail: wilfried.dumon@soc.kuleuven.ac.be
website: http://www.kuleuven.ac.be/kuleuven/
Wilfried DUMON
national expert
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30 Percent of the Working
Population Lives on
Social Benefits
A general debate on the
Danish welfare state gave
rise to a number of
parliamentary decisions
and government
initiatives but failed to
substantially change
family policies and family
law. The main problem of
the Danish welfare-state model
is the financial burden on the state
budget. Social transfers constitute the
main source of household income for around
30 percent of the working-age population. This
high transfer level has led to a debate on
alternative ways of organising the welfare
system.
Family Structure
Because most mothers work outside the home,
parents tend to share the care for their chil-
dren. In Denmark, 86 percent of all
women aged 30 to 50 work full-time (i.e.
at least 30 hours per week). As in other
Member States, Danish women
take on more (unpaid)
housework than men, while
fathers invest more
time in (paid)
work done
outside the home.
The trend, however, is
against a more equal
distribution of time
between spouses.
According to
estimates, one out of
every three children experiences her or his
parents’ divorce. 11 percent of all children of
divorced parents (28,000 children under 18)
live with their father. Among younger children,
this percentage is much lower. The number of
children who do not live with their parents 
(1.3 percent in 1996) has declined since the
1980s.
Family Policies
In 1993, the Inter-Ministerial Committee on
Children launched an action programme to
facilitate the reconciliation of work and family
life. A report prepared in the course of this
programme states that it is possible to develop
more family-friendly workplaces, based on the
wishes of the employees. These wishes mainly
concern flexibility in working hours and work
organisation. Surprisingly, employed parents
are not interested in day-care facilities organ-
ised by the firm and usually prefer public day-
care services.
Though the number of day-care facilities
increased considerably within the last years,
demand still exceeds supply. Special attention
will be paid to the growing need for day-care
facilities that extend their hours beyond the
traditional workday.
There are child-care facilities for every age
group. The offer ranges from such day-care
facilities for children as nurseries and
supervised family day care, to after-school
centres. In line with the “Child Care
Guarantee”, these facilities have to be 
provided by the local authorities.
In general, the economic situation of families
and children is satisfactory. However, when
considering that more people have to live from
the available funds, the per capita income of
families with children is, on the average, lower
than that of families without children.
Unemployment Affects
Children
Many family problems are closely connected
with parental unemployment. In 1998, 7.3
percent of the Danes were without work.
Violence, health and family problems,
attempted suicides, alcoholism and criminal
offences are observed more frequently with
people who have been unemployed for longer
periods. One out of every two children from
families where one or both parents are dealing
with long-term unemployment experiences the
breakdown of her or his family. 
A Right to Public Day Care
Finnish family policy follows the so-called
‘Scandinavian (or Nordic) welfare model’. The
main challenge to Finnish social policy in the
early part of this decade was a sharp economic
decline. From 1991 to 1994, all wage earners
lost an average of 7.6 percent of their available
income. This development has heightened the
controversy on social policy as a whole. Social
expenditures were cut in many ways, and
families and unemployed people were
particularly hit by these cutbacks. Despite
these difficulties, Finland is the only Member
State in the European Union to have fully
implemented all of the 50 social-related
directives that have come into force. In the past
few years, the Finnish economy has rapidly
recovered.
Social Forsknings Instituttet
Herluf Trolles Gade 11
DK-1052 Copenhagen
phone: +45-33-48 08 86
fax: +45-33-48 08 33
e-mail: jeb@sfi.dk
website: http://www.sfi.dk
Jens BONKE
national expert
Denmark
Finland
Jens Bonke is an economist. The focus of his
work is on time budgets, the monetary
assessment of unpaid housework, the
distribution of resources within and between
families, and social welfare and childhood
issues.
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Family Demography
In Finland, the fertility rate has remained
relatively high. Finland has one of
the lowest rates of maternal deaths
(3.3 per hundredthousand), stillbirths
(4.0 per thousand), and infant
mortality (3.9 per thousand) (1997
figures). Despite a steady increase in the
number of separations and divorces, four
out of every five children still spend their
childhood with their biological parents.
The number of cohabiting couples has also
shown an upsurge: In 1997, every sixth
family was of this type. However,
cohabitees frequently decide to
marry when they have a child.
Parents tend to cohabit more often
than in former times, but the
number of lone mothers is also
rising. People who have no
children are most likely to divorce
and separate, while parents of two
children have the most stable
relationships. If the parents
are not married, the risk that
the children will experience a
separation is five times
higher than that affecting
children born to married
parents.
Reconciling Family
and Work
The Finns are very
proud of the high level
of equality achieved
in their country.
Female labour-
market partici-
pation is high in
Finland. Young fathers
increasingly take on re-
sponsibilities for child care and
housework, but young mothers—most
of whom work—still do the lion’s share of
the housework.
In a project financed by the European Union,
various models for combining family and work
are being tested in collaboration with ten
different types of firms. One example gives the
employee a chance to save up time on an
account and to use it when there is a need for
care leave involving children.
Child Care
Women are entitled to 105 workdays of
maternity leave. After that, either parent is
entitled to a leave of 158 days. On the average,
the benefit for parental leave is 70 percent of
one’s income. However, this percentage will
decrease if the income exceeds a certain
level. In addition, every new-born child
receives a substantial maternity package
containing baby equipment. The state
child allowance is paid up to age 17.
Communities and municipalities have
been responsible for establishing suitable
child-care facilities since 1973. In 1990, the
right to placement in public day care was
granted to all children below the age of three.
In 1996, this right was enlarged to include all
children below the age of seven. Low-income
families may be totally exempted from paying
for day-care charges. Parents of children under
three who do not use municipal day-care
services are granted an allowance for their
children’s home care. 
Family Renaissance
Changes everywhere! This is how you could
describe the situation of families in France.
Since 1965, the likelihood of divorce has
quadrupled (from 10 to 40 percent in 1997).
While 30 years ago just six percent of children
were born outside marriage, the rate had
rocketed to 40 percent by 1997. Yet the French
are about to rediscover the benefits of family
life. Their behaviour has not changed
fundamentally, but new ideas are emerging. As
Claude Martin ironically says: “The best way
to sell a vacuum-cleaner in France today is to
show a man vacuuming his home.”
Reconciling Family and Work
This subject has been fiercely debated, but up
to now not much has been done to help
women reconcile family and work. Some 70
percent of all women are gainfully employed:
45 percent of the women with three children
work, and 16 percent of all women have a
part-time job (as opposed to 11 percent ten
years ago). The government often praises part-
time jobs as a measure to reconcile family and
work, but companies tend to see them as a tool
to improve labour flexibility. Nevertheless there
are some genuine model enterprises: One of
them is the hospital of Saint Camille, a private
non-profit operation which won a European
award. This hospital, when looking into ways
to improve the working conditions of its
employees, founded its own service
organisation
National Research and Development
Centre for Welfare and Health (STAKES)
Siltasaarenkatu 18
PO Box 220, FIN-00531 Helsinki
phone: +358-9-39 67 2148
fax: +358-9-39 67 2201
e-mail: sirpa.taskinen@stakes.fi
website: http://www.stakes.fi/
Sirpa TASKINEN
national expert
A psychologist by training, Sirpa Taskinen
has acquired practical experience in hospitals
and family guidance centres. She now works
at the National Research and Development
Centre for Welfare and Health (STAKES),
where she is in charge of issues relating to
the promotion of welfare and health as well
as the prevention of social problems.
France
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Principle and Practice
In 1998, public life was dominated by the
elections to the 14th German Bundestag. The
debate focused on the tax reform and on the
various models proposed by each of the
political parties represented in the Bundestag,
as well as on a new and more appropriate
division of responsibilities between state and
business. Studying out its impact on families,
Thomas Bahle and Franz Rothenbacher,
experts of the European Observatory until
1996, made this pointed observation: “It is the
family that must shoulder the burden when the
state withdraws and the market fails to provide
the necessary goods and services. When
politicians speak of ‘self-reliance’ and
‘individual responsibility’ they must—or
should—have the family in mind. If the
balance between the state, the market, and the
family is shifting towards more ‘self-reliance’,
then the family definitely needs more support
in order to fulfil its duties.”
Family Structure
The number of both single-
person and multi-person
households is growing, though the
mean size of private households is
declining. Trends indicate that marriage and
childbirth are being continuously postponed.
These developments do not mean that family
and marriage are less important. A study on
Germany
Deutsches Jugendinstitut e.V.
Sozialberichterstattung
Nockherstrasse 2, D-81541 Munich
phone: +49-89-623 06 234
fax: +49-89-623 06 162
e-mail: bien@dji.de
website: http://www.dji.de
Walter BIEN
national expert
Walter Bien is an expert on family studies
and head of the Department for Social
Reporting of the German Youth Institute in
Munich.
offering a range of services to the hospital
staff. Nurses deliver their laundry in the
morning and get it back washed and ironed
after work; sewing, cooking and cleaning
services round off the picture. In co-operation
with the national employment office, ten long-
term unemployed persons were hired to
perform these services.
Child Care
Child care is a major issue in France. Since
1988, 1,800 child-care contracts have been
signed with community authorities to provide
public coverage. Since 1995, parents who leave
their child with a day-care mother have been
able to receive an allowance of FF 800
(Euro 122) until the child’s third birthday.
Since 1986, the government has been
providing a subsidy to working parents with
children under six who employ a daily helper,
though this measure has been highly
controversial. The market for child-care
facilities is not growing.
Parents who take a full or partial job break to
stay home with children under three are
entitled to a child-raising allowance, provided
at least two children are cared for. The full rate
is FF 2,964 (Euro 452), payable when the
parent takes a full break; but graduations are
possible. 
Centre de recherches administratives et 
politiques CNRS
Institut d’études politiques de Rennes
Bld. de la Duchesse Anne 104, F-35700 Rennes
phone: +33-2-99 02 28 38
fax: +33-2-99 02 28 66
e-mail: cmartin@ensp.fr
website: http://www.cnrs.fr/
Claude MARTIN
national expert
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values has found that family still is ranked
most highly by the population. Partnerships
are not as unstable as is often thought. Walter
Bien from the German Youth Institute
summarises the situation as follows: “Families
have never had it so good: People have more
leisure time and they actually spend it
together, yet reality is still far removed from
the ideal.”
As (and perhaps because) the number of
children per family is declining, conditions for
the young generation are better than ever.
Relations between the generations are relaxed.
Compared to former times, younger people no
longer carry the burden of direct obligations
for the older generations. Housing is less
cramped, allowing people to enjoy intimacy at
a distance.
Fathers
Fathers increasingly make efforts to assume
more responsibilities within the family. Yet the
rule still applies that men profit from marriage,
especially with regard to their gainful
employment, while women are the losers in
terms of social security and financial aspects,
as well as regarding the division of labour. As
a result, unmarried men are less well off
economically than unmarried women, unless
the latter have children in their household.
The Risk of Poverty
Over the past few years, it has become
increasingly clear that the risk of becoming
impoverished is shifting from the old to the
young. The number of children receiving
social assistance has quadrupled over the past
15 years. Christian Palentien of the University
of Bielefeld states it unequivocally: “When
you decide to have a child you are on the road
to economic ruin.” Nevertheless, this applies
neither to all families nor to all life phases.
Those most affected are women under 30 with
children under six and no partner: Two out of
three subsist on an income at the social-
assistance level. Empty-nest parents, on the
other hand, are the strongest group in
economic terms. 
Schools Operate in Shifts
Demography
Greek fertility is declining; in 1996, the rate
was below 1.4 children per woman. Most
children are born to married parents. Although
divorce remains infrequent, three out of four
cases affect families with children. Divorce is
particularly frequent after five to seven years of
marriage; as a consequence, the children
affected are very young.
Family Policies
In 1997, the social budget amounted to 25.8
percent of the gross national product. In 1996,
half of this budget was spent on social
insurance (mainly pensions), and all the other
social expenditures made up the other half
(health: 4.8 percent; education: 3.4; welfare:
2.2; housing 0.7; unemployment and training
for re-employment: 0.8; miscellaneous: 1.1).
Greek family policies definitely focus on the
promotion of larger families. The amount of
Greece
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the allowance
for the third child was
recently increased from GRD
34,000 (Euro 103) to GRD 40,000
(Euro 121) per month. Moreover, the child’s
age up to which the mother can benefit from
the allowance was raised from three to six.
Every mother of four or more children
receives GRD 10,000 (Euro 30) per month for
every unmarried child under 23. In addition,
such mothers are paid a tax-free monthly
pension of GRD 23,000 (Euro 70) for life,
provided the annual family income is not in
excess of GRD 3,000,000 (Euro 9,236).
From a financial point of view, the overall
situation of families is much less favourable in
Greece than in the other Member States of the
European Union. According to the findings of
a survey carried out in 1996, 44 percent of the
households feel that their financial situation
has deteriorated.
Reconciling Family and Work
On the public level, reconciliation of family
and work has not been particularly promoted.
However, there is rising awareness that parents
need support—not only because people in
Greece have longer working hours
than the European average, but
also because of the peculiarities
of the Greek school system. In Greece,
average working hours are 46.7 weekly (60.5
for employers, 55 for self-employed), and 16
percent of the workers have a second job.
Trade unions are promoting the 35-hour week
without any decrease in pay as a means of
fighting unemployment. The average daily
time spent on child care is 90 minutes for
women and 36 minutes for men.
Department of Social Policy 
and Social Anthropology
Panteion University
Leof. Syngrou 136, GR-176 71 Athens
phone: +30-1-920 10 36 or +30-1-920 17 31
fax: +30-1-923 82 90 or +30-1-920 17 31
e-mail: lmous@panteion.gr
website: http://www.panteion.gr/
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Due to a lack of classrooms, in particular in
urban areas, the great majority of public
schools operate on a shift system. As the shifts
often follow a rotation pattern, the children
sometimes go to school in the mornings and
sometimes in the afternoons. This scheme
creates many problems for parents who have to
cope with time variations in care, meal
arrangements, and travel to and from school.
The stress on parents with several children
rises, if the children are taught in different
shifts.
In order to promote gender equality, Greece
has introduced a special programme designed
to protect women from unemployment and
poverty, improve their social and professional
status, and safeguard their health. 
The Irish Are the
Youngest
Family Policies
A high number of births, a
trend towards cohabitation,
and a high risk among children to become
poor: These are the benchmark data of the
Irish family. The Irish economy’s growth rate
of 5.75 percent exceeds the European average
and permits a more active family policy.
Ireland has no explicitly pro-birth policy.
Gabriel Kiely explains that, despite the
temptation to consider the higher benefits paid
to families with three or more children
pronatalist, this measure was actually
introduced to support poorer families with
more children.
Demography
The 1996 Census shows an increase in the
total population of 2.7 percent over the 1991
Census. Contrary to most other European
countries, this is not due to inward migration
but to a comparatively high birth rate.
Statistically, every woman in Ireland had 
1.92 children in 1997. However, birth rates are
also declining in Ireland,
though from an
originally high
level. More than 20
percent of the
children are born
out of wedlock.
Ireland has the
youngest
population in
the European
Union. The share
of those younger
than 14 is 30.9
percent. In 1996, the
share of those older than
65 was 11 percent. The
projections for the year 2026 are
19 percent for this age group, indicating
that the Irish population will remain young in
decades to come.
Family Structure
In 1994, the marriage rate was 4.4 per
thousand inhabitants. This corresponds to the
trend persisting since the 1970s. The rate is
continuously dropping. There are no reliable
figures on cohabitation. It is, however,
assumed that the decline in marriage rates and
the rise in the number of births outside
marriage reflect a trend towards cohabitation.
Homeless Children
There are around 5,000 homeless people in
Ireland; almost ten percent of them are
children. More than 400 homeless children are
picked up by the police in the streets of Dublin
every year. A report shows that the homeless
are getting younger and younger. These
children leave their homes because of family
problems, poverty, abuse or neglect.
Child Benefits for Families
The allowance paid a family for a child is the pre-eminent state benefit within the scope of
family allowances. In most Member States, the amount paid depends on the number of
children. The benefit is financed through one of two schemes. In Austria, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, the
allowance is paid from public funds. In Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal,
it is financed from employers’ contributions, with the state topping up funds in Italy and
Luxembourg. Greece and Spain have a mixed system: Employers, employees and the state
all contribute. In addition, there are differences among countries, depending on the
children’s age and the parents’ income. In some countries, lone parents receive extra
payments. Most countries also grant birth allowances and other cash benefits (e.g. when
the child starts going to school), as well as additional payments for children with
disabilities.
Family Studies Centre
Department of Social Sciences
University College Dublin
Belfield Campus, IRL-Dublin 4
phone: +353-1-706 85 10
+353-1-706 84 19
fax: +353-1-706 11 97
Gabriel KIELY
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Gabriel Kiely heads the Department of
Social Policy and Social Work at the
University College Dublin. He is the
president of the Centre for Family Studies
and has been a member of the European
Observatory on Family Matters from its very
beginning.
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Altogether, there are fewer marriages and a
steady rise of those that end in divorce. Even
so, the Italian divorce rate is still far below
European levels. Some 90 percent of children
under 18 live with both their parents, and
almost eight percent with one parent.
Similarly, women’s position in Italy has
undergone substantial change. Today, women
are acquiring more interests outside the family;
they have the same goals as men in terms of
education and jobs, so that they postpone
marrying and having children and give birth to
fewer children. Women’s employment is still
lower in Italy than in many other European
countries, but women have been catching up. 
It its mostly the young women who enter the
labour market in droves, and they intend to
stay on even after they have children.
Hotel ‘La Mamma’
Young people tend to stay on with their
parents and delay establishing their
own households. About 90 percent
of those under 24 live with their
parents—not only those who are
studying and financially dependent
on their parents, but even those who
already have a job of their own.
Experts attribute the trend to cultural
roots and traditions, the proverbial
protectiveness of Italian families towards their
children, and the ‘familyism’ of Catholic
origin. In Southern Italy, however, young
people do not always stay on their own
volition: One in three 15- to 24-year-olds is
unemployed, and in some areas the rate
reaches 50–60 percent.
Child Labour
By law, the minimum working age is 15, but
compulsory education ends at 14. The
resultant gap contributes to the illegal
employment of minors. According to a study,
there are some 50,000 children under the age
of 14 who work despite the ban. A survey of
1989 found that about seven percent of
children between 6 and 13 years of age help
their parents by working outside the home on a
more or less regular basis. 
Dipartimento di Scienze Demografiche
Università degli Studi di Roma ‘La Sapienza’
Via Nomentana 41, I-00161 Rome
phone: +39-06-499 195 20
fax: +39-06-853 033 74
e-mail: sgritta@dsd.sta.uniroma1.it
website: http://www.uniroma1.it
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Lone Parents
The Minister for Social Welfare introduced a
new one-parent family payment, which took
effect on 1 January 1997. The former lone
parent’s allowance and deserted wife’s benefit
were amalgamated in the new payment. This
brought about full equality between men and
women in this area and removed the concept
of ‘desertion’ from the social welfare system.
Since 1997, all lone parents have been al-
lowed to earn IEP 6,000 (Euro 7,618) per
year without losing their allowance, and up to
IEP 12,000 (Euro 15,237) while receiving a
partial allowance. This was designed to help
lone parents enter the labour market.
Reconciling Family and Work
In 1996, a report on the introduction of
family-friendly initiatives in the workplace
stated that “despite the existence of
legislation on equal pay and equal
opportunities at work, employment practices
in many organisations still reflect a view that
workers are male employees without family
responsibilities”. 
A Population Shifting 
towards the Old
Demographic Development
The extended Italian family, that cherished
cliché, has long since become a thing of the
past. While the number of families is rising,
families themselves are shrinking. Birth rates
are about 40 percent lower than the replace-
ment threshold that would guarantee
population stability from generation to
generation. Italian women give birth to 1.2
children on average. Over the past 20 years,
the birth rate has been so low that, in 1996,
Italy became the only country in the world in
which the number of older people exceeded
that of the young. The ageing of the popu-
lation is a major problem for Italian society.
In the past few years, there has been a virtual
explosion of pension payments in terms of
gross domestic product. Pension payments
make up more than 70 percent of social
expenditure.
Italy
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have their first child; the rest when they have
the second child. Only four percent of small
children attend a kindergarten or other child-
care facility. Compulsory schooling starts at
five, but 95 percent of all children attend
nursery school at four. Primary school starts at
six and takes six years.
On the other hand, many people hold part-time
jobs. Two out of three women hold a job of
fewer than 35 hours per week. This allows
women to better reconcile their family and
working life. In theory, everybody is progressive
and agrees that household chores should be
shared equally between both partners and
handled jointly by them. However, although
quite a few fathers are changing nappies and
taking care of the kids, women still feel
pressure in trying to be good mothers.
The government includes many members who
are models of pro-family orientation: Some
ministers leave parliamentary sessions early to
be with their family. The finance minister is
known for taking his children to school in the
morning and insisting on sharing his dinner
with them.
Reconciling
Family and Work
In the Netherlands, reconciling family and work
is not the subject of any sweeping debate, not
least because full-time employment is relatively
low. Parental leave is very short and there are
few child-care facilities within companies. Most
Dutch are relatively affluent and feel that the
family is their private affair, so that no genuine
pressure for change has been building up at the
political level. Most educated women prefer to
give up their gainful employment to stay home
with their children. Should they wish to
continue in their job, they need to spend 30 to
Rarely Do Both Parents 
Work Full-Time
Demographic Development
The number of births rose by 4.9 percent in
1996, with a fertility rate of 1.76. Such levels
had not been reached since the beginning of
the 1970s. This growth took place mainly
within the foreign population; the natural
increase amongst those from the
traditional ethnic group of
‘natives’ was negative. Between
1995 and 2025, population
growth is expected to produce a
slanted age structure: The
projected increase in the
proportion of those aged
60 and above is more
than 40 percent, one of
the highest rates in the
European Union.
As for family statistics,
Luxembourg (like other
comparable EU Member States)
has recorded a rise in the number
of divorces and births outside
marriage: 15 percent of all new births
are of this category.
Family Policies
As a rule, a woman caring for her child has
problems reconciling work and family. Only 17
percent of all children live in households
where both parents work full-time.
Child-care facilities do not meet women’s
requirements. One in every two women would
like to have more crèches and nurseries
available with hours more suited to her needs.
In 1996, 1,123 children between the ages of
two months and six years were enrolled in
some type of child-care facility, while 862
enquiries could not be met.
Children go to nursery school from the age of
four. Primary education begins at age six, and
schooling is compulsory until the age of 15.
Schools usually close as soon as classes are
over; currently, only 12 out of 118
communities offer care in the
afternoon. Few schools have
canteens, and the children have
to go home for lunch. It is
easy to see why many
mothers choose to stay
at home.
A major
challenge for the
whole system is
the high per-
centage of foreign
nationals (almost 
30 percent of primary
school children are
foreigners), so that multi-
lingualism is a crucial element in
the country’s educational system. 
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The Netherlands: 
A Land of Two Faces
There are two faces to the Netherlands: On the
one hand, just five percent of all women with
children work at a full-time job; and only 29
percent of the Dutch believe that women
should contribute to the family income, as
opposed to 75 percent of all Europeans. It is
therefore the perceived opinion in the
Netherlands that a single earner’s salary
suffices to provide for the partner and two
children. Most women stop working when they
Netherlands
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50 percent of their income on child care and
transportation.
Mothers are not forced to take jobs for
financial considerations. In 1963, the
Netherlands introduced the ‘Algemene
Bijstandswet’, a government-guaranteed
minimum income to which anyone who has
no income from work or property is entitled.
Thus, a lone parent with one child receives
HFL 1,444.90 (Euro 656) per month after
taxes. A couple with one 10-year-old child gets
HFL 2,004.22 (Euro 909); a couple with one 
8- and one 12-year-old receives HFL 2,189.77
(Euro 994).
Parental Leave Benefits
All expectant mothers in the Netherlands who
have health insurance receive 100 percent of
their pre-tax salary up to a maximum daily
rate of HFL 289 (Euro 131) for altogether 16
weeks. They give birth at home, attended by
midwives, except when medical reasons advise
another course. The women are entitled to
home care for at least 24 hours and at most 80
hours within the first ten days. Their own
contribution is HFL 6 (Euro 2.70) per hour.
Hospital costs accrued for medical reasons are
paid by the state. The benefit is due not just to
insured women but also to women and
daughters co-insured with their husbands or
fathers. 
Poverty Breeds Truancy
Family Policies
Although the economic situation in Portugal
has improved during the past 15–20 years,
poverty continues to be a great challenge for
Portuguese family policy: 19 percent of all
families in Portugal are poor. The 1991 Census
showed that 2.3 percent of all families had no
electricity, 12 percent had no indoor toilet, 12
percent had no water supply,
and 18 percent no bathroom.
Portugal, in common
with other southern
European
countries, may be
described as a
country with a
strong and
explicit
ideological
commitment
to the
family, but a
low profile as
far as family
policy is
concerned.
The family is
expected to
compensate for
weaknesses of social policies. At the end of
1995, the Socialist government began dis-
cussing social-policy measures and support for
low-income families. Some topics—such as
child abuse, domestic violence or abortion—
had been totally taboo up to that time. In July
1996, a guaranteed minimum income was
introduced and fixed at PTE 54,600 (Euro
272), though the sums paid are lower. Two
adults get PTE 20,000 (Euro 100) each, and
children get PTE 10,000 (Euro 50). People
who claim the guaranteed minimum income
are required to participate in a social inte-
gration programme. Among other things, 
this has contributed to reduced absenteeism of
children from school. At the end of 1996,
2,606 households lived on this benefit: 
45 percent were couples with children, and 
22 percent were lone parents.
Faculteit der Psychologie en Pedagogiek
Van der Boechorst Straat 1
NL-1081 BT Amsterdam
phone: +31-20-444-88 84 
+31-20-444-89 00
fax: +31-20-444 87 45
e-mail: HJ.Schulze@psy.vu.nl
website: http://www.psy.vu.nl/
Hans-Joachim SCHULZE
national expert
Hans-Joachim Schulze is a researcher at
Vrije Universiteit who focuses on communi-
cation styles within the family and on relat-
ions between families and their environ-
ment. He closely collaborates with Peter
Cuyvers, who works for the Nederlandse
Gezinsraad (Netherlands Family Council),
studying family development and family
reporting in the Netherlands.
Portugal
Protection and Benefits for Expectant and Nursing Mothers
In addition to labour-law provisions introduced in all member states of the European
Union to protect expectant and nursing mothers, regulations stemming from social-
insurance laws exist in all countries and are enforced by the systems responsible for
preventive health care. In Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands, this task is carried out by the statutory health-insurance organisations; in
the other countries, it is the responsibility of the state health-care services.
Benefits granted to expectant and nursing mothers include benefits in kind (inter alia
access to medical care) as well as cash benefits designed to compensate for income lost
during the period in which mothers are legally barred from working. This period differs
within the European Union, varying from 14 to 28 weeks. Benefits are subject to similar
variations, from 50 percent of the lost pretax income (Greece) to 100 percent (Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain). Benefits in cash and kind are generally granted only after the mother has
qualified for a certain minimum insurance period within the respective system.
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Fertility Rates in Europe
Source: Council of Europe 1998; calculations ÖIF-hs
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unemployment among the younger generation
forces large numbers of young Spaniards to
remain with their parents. Only 30 percent of
the women and 14 percent of the men live as
couples, as opposed to 55 percent and 36
percent, respectively, in France, Germany and
the UK. By the end of 1996, there were 
6.8 million children under 16, representing 
17.3 percent of the total Spanish population.
The overwhelming majority of them live in
families of two parents.
Family Policies
Parental-leave benefits are unknown in Spain:
People who interrupt their vocational career to
look after their children have to do so without
pay. In 1997, the family allowance for depend-
ent children was uprated in proportion to
inflation forecasts. Only a small percentage of a
family’s real expenses can be de-
ducted from its taxable
income, a factor
which
weakens
the fiscal
protection of
the family. There are,
however, special benefits for large families.
The number of public child-care facilities is
insufficient. Spanish men hardly help out with
household chores. Though the government
supports workplace nurseries, the demand by
far exceeds the supply. This makes it even more
difficult for women to reconcile family and
work. Poverty is yet another problem. An
estimated 15 percent of the households with
children under 17 live below the poverty line.
Dangers to Children
Concerning risks to children, the focus in on
three areas: maltreatment, sexual abuse and
economic exploitation. According to some
local studies that have been extrapolated to all
of Spain, 23 percent of the girls and 15 percent
Education
In the late 1980s, in order to reduce the high
illiteracy rate, compulsory schooling was
extended from six to nine years. The number
of dropouts is high, absenteeism being partly
due to child labour: 1,434 cases of child labour
were detected between 1990 and 1995. For a
long time, children were considered their
parents’ property. This concept has changed
only gradually over the last two decades.
The expansion of compulsory schooling was
not accompanied by the necessary develop-
ment of facilities. Pupils are often taught in
two shifts. According to estimates, around
100,000 children drop out of school every year
without completing compulsory education. Of
those who remain at school, about one third
have severe difficulties. A survey showed that
one to two thirds of all children have nobody
to help them with their homework.
Reconciling Family and Work
Reconciling family and work is a major
problem for Portuguese families. Women who
are now in their fifties have hardly ever worked
outside the home, but young women are
expected to keep their full-time job when they
have children. Women and men agree that
both partners should contribute to the family
income. However, child-care facilities are
lacking in Portugal. There are hardly any
nurseries for children below age three, because
the state considers child care a purely
educational task. For this reason, the current
offer only comprises pre-school day nurseries
for children above three. Many care facilities
are open only five hours per day and close
during lunch. Only 50 percent of children in
the age group from three to six are in formal
day-care arrangements. 
Finding Work is a
Problem for Young
People
The economic situation in Spain has
undergone a perceptible improvement in the
last few years. A growing domestic product
and a drop in inflation to 1.5 percent in 1998
are both benchmark data for the Spanish
economy. The still-high unemployment rate
(18.2 percent by the end of 1998) remains the
main social problem. Unemployment
particularly hits young people and women.
The majority of unemployed people live as
dependants in a family unit. The unem-
ployment rate of breadwinners is only nine
percent, while their daughters and sons
experience three times that rate.
Demography
Fertility has remained at a very low level (1.16
children per woman in 1997) and continues to
decline in younger age groups. The high rate of
Spain
Instituto de Ciências Sociais
Universidade de Lisboa
Av. das Forças Armadas, P-1600 Lisbon
phone: +351-1-79 95 048 
+351-1-79 95 000
fax: +351 1 79 64 953
e-mail: karin.wall@ics.ul.pt
website: http://www.ics.ul.pt/
Karin Elisabeth WALL
national expert
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of the boys have suffered from sexual abuse at
least once in their lives. According to official
figures, child labour is not very frequent: At
the age of 14–15, three per thousand worked
in 1995 as opposed to six per thousand in
1990. However, in rural areas or small towns,
high school absenteeism might be an indi-
cation that some child labour does exist in
Spain. 
Families: Victims of
Consolidation Policy?
Since 1996, the Swedish government has
endeavoured to reduce the national budget
deficit. The local level has been assuming
more and more responsibilities. During recent
years, there have been considerable cuts in
local budgets for financing social services. This
has had a negative impact on the living
conditions of families.
Demographic Trends
Birth rates in Sweden increased steadily during
the 1980s. This trend has been broken from the
beginning of the 1990s onwards (birth rate
1995: 1.4 percent). In a European comparison
in the 1990s, Sweden was the country with the
largest decline in fertility. This development
is attributed to various factors: Many
women postpone the birth of their
first child, and fewer couples have
a third child. Birth rates have
decreased most among the less
educated. Other explanations
are high unemployment,
problems related to one’s
foothold in the labour
market, and longer
enrolment in educational
programmes.
Family Policies
Families were hit not only
by the consolidation
measures, but also by high
unemployment: In 1998,
the unemployment rate
was 7.3 percent. Higher
costs for social services
(housing, child care), higher
taxes, reduced benefits from
social insurance schemes and
lower allowances have all decreased
the purchasing power of families. Lone
mothers and low-income families are the
biggest losers. The disposable income of
families with children has become lower.
Couples without children and households with
retired couples have fared better than house-
holds with children. Needs testing has been
tightened.
Education
During the past few years, the Swedish school
system was subject to a number of changes.
Teaching hours have decreased, and school
expenditures have been reduced in different
ways while the amount of pupils has
increased.
Parents with a low educational level tend to
choose schools in areas where the ethnic and
social background resembles their own. This
increases social segregation.  Department of Sociology
Göteborgs Universitet
Box 720, S-405 30 Göteborg
phone: +46-31-773 47 89
fax: +46-31-773 47 64
e-mail: Ulla.Bjornberg@sociology.gu.se
website: http://www.gu.se/
Ulla BJÖRNBERG
national expert
Sweden
Instituto de Economía y Geografía (CSIC)
Calle Pinar, 25, E-28006 Madrid
phone: +34-91-411 23 57
fax: +34-91-562 55 67
e-mail: jafc@ieg.csic.es
Juan Antonio 
FERNÁNDEZ CORDÓN
national expert
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Gradual Discovery 
of Family Policies
Family Structure
30 percent of British households have
dependent children; 80 percent of British
children live in a family with two parents, and
nine out of ten of these parents are married.
However, currently one in three babies is born
out of wedlock. In 60 percent of the two
parent families with children, both parents go
to work, but most mothers work part-time.
British women are delaying having children to
increasingly higher ages; on average, they are 
27 when they have their first child. Child-
lessness is increasing. In this generation of
childbearing women, one in five is predicted to
remain childless compared with one in ten in
their mothers’ generation.
Family Policies
Family policy in Britain has been described as
‘implicit’. Family life has always been con-
sidered a private matter with the state’s role
essentially one of providing both a broad
legislative framework regulating marriage and
divorce and other key events and some
underlying fiscal support. The state only
actively intervened when something went
seriously wrong. Nevertheless, family life is of
major importance to the British public. A
recent national survey showed that people
valued their family relationships as eleven
times more important than their friends.
Family issues grew in political importance
over the 1990s and the Labour government
has gone further than any other British
government in developing explicit policies for
families. It inherited legislation for divorce
reform which had fuelled a public debate on
marriage and divorce and, like the previous
Conservative government, Labour has been
concerned with preventing juvenile
delinquency and youth crime and the general
issue of parenting.
Family policy in Britain currently focuses
on families with children and in
particular is concerned with tackling
the family poverty associated with
unemployment and non-working lone
parents. A number of measures are
being introduced to encourage workless
parents off social security into
employment. Chief of these are the New
Deal for Lone Parents, the Working Family
Tax Credit and the National Childcare
Strategy. These last two measures essentially
subsidise or top up the income of low-paid
workers and provide financial help to meet the
costs of formal child care so enabling parents
to work.
In addition, the government has tackled the
machinery of family policy making, his-
torically spread across several government
Departments. A Ministerial Group has been
set up, chaired at a senior level by the Home
Secretary, on which ministers from all relevant
Departments sit. This aims to look at family
policy issues holistically. This Committee has
led to the publication of the first ever consul-
tation document on family policy. “Supporting
Families” was published in November 1998
and provoked considerable public interest. The
document is essentially a record of the govern-
ment’s main activities and initiatives for fam-
ilies since taking office and identifies areas for
further work and consultation.
To date public policy for families has been
characterised by rhetoric for all parents but
significant programmes and resources are
targeted at the vulnerable or disadvantaged
such as lone parents, parents in poor areas,
teenage and new parents. Among the issues
causing political or public concern are: 
• The high incidence of family and child 
poverty—one in three children in Britain
lives below the poverty line.
• Marriage and relationship stability: High
levels of divorce are accompanied by a 
growing incidence of cohabitation and extra-
marital childbearing.
• Balancing home and work life: Men in
Britain work the largest hours in Europe.
• Teenage pregnancy—the highest rate in
Europe and not falling significantly. Most
teenage mothers (85 percent) are unmarried
and a very high proportion are financially
dependent on the State. 
Family Policy Studies Centre
Tavistock Place 9, UK-London WC1H 9SN
phone: +44-171-388 59 00
fax: +44-171-388 56 00
e-mail: fpsc@mailbox.ulcc.ac.uk
website: http://www.fpsc.org.uk
Ceridwen ROBERTS
national expert
United
Kingdom
Ceridwen Roberts, originally an industrial
sociologist, has been working on family
research and policy since 1992 when she
became Director of the Family Policy
Studies Centre. Her earlier work was on
women’s lifetime employment and labour
market flexibility issues (part-time work,
working time, etc.). More recently, she has
researched kinship, parenting problems and
worked on projects on lone parents, child
support, fatherhood, marriage and divorce
and teenage pregnancy and parenthood.
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1) Were the subjects of this issue interesting to
you?
 Yes mostly
 Yes, partly
 No, not at all
2) What subjects would you like to read about in
the Family Observer?
3) Do you think the Family Observer is ...?
informative      not informative
superficial      thorough
neutral      value-biased
non-dynamic      dynamic
single oriented      family oriented
interesting      uninteresting
progressive      conservative
female oriented      male oriented
relevant      irrelevant
colourless      colourful
easy to understand      difficult to understand
4) How do you like the photographs?
 Very much
 Allright
 So-so
 Not much
 Not at all
5) How do you like the layout (e.g. format, font,
paper quality)?
 Very much
 Allright
 So-so
 Not much
 Not at all
6) Do you think the layout is...?
modern      old-fashioned
easy to read      hard to read
clear      cluttered
handy      unwieldy
attractive      unattractive
interesting      boring
7) Which would be your preferred language for 
reading the Family Observer?
8) How would you like to get the Family Observer?
 As a magazine  As a CD-ROM  Via Internet
9) Do you want to continue receiving the Family
Observer?
 Yes  No
10) Do you know anybody who might be interested
in this publication? If so, please provide full
addresses.
Your Comment:
About yourself:
11) Gender:
 female  male
12) Status:
 single  cohabiting
 married  divorced  widowed
13) Age:
........ years old
14) Do you have children?
 no  yes
Number of children:  Ages of children:
15) Highest level of schooling completed:
 primary education  secondary education
 tertiary education
16) In what field do you work?
 Administration  Politics / NGO
 Science  Family counselling
 Journalism  Other:
Reader’s Poll’  ll
The Family Observer is trying to provide an overview of scientific research findings that is accessible to
a broader public. We would like you to tell us whether we have been successful in our efforts, and nat-
urally we are also interested in finding out what we can do better in the future.
Please return the questionnaire to Irene M. Kernthaler, Austrian Institute for Family Studies (ÖIF),
Gonzagagasse 19/8, A–1010 Vienna, Austria, Fax: +43-1-535 14 55.
The results of this poll will be published on the Observatory’s home page:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg05/family/observatory/home.html
Thank you for your input and participation! 
“In my work, I try to link my different roles as artist, mother, housewife, teacher, and organiser. Spheres of life,
roles and experiences that are normally meticulously separated intermingle, influence and impact upon each other.
My photos for this issue are based on this concept: pictures of children’s rooms, toys, cuddly animals, Lego bricks. 
I work with the things I am confronted with in my everyday life.”
The artist speaks of her work for the Family Observer:
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Born in Zams/Tyrol, Austria
1980–1984 Academy of Fine Arts, Vienna/diploma in painting
1985–1987 University of Applied Arts, Vienna
1988–1989 Lecturer at the University of Applied Arts, Vienna (P. Weibel)
1989 State Fellowship for Fine Arts
Selection of Own Exhibits (O) and Participation in 
Other Exhibits (P)
1990 Sammlung EA Generali, Secession Vienna (P)
1991 Sub Trans Alpina, Valley of Aosta (P)
1992 Stadt der Frauen (Women’s Town), Innsbruck (P)
Gallery Elefant, Landeck (O)
1993 Fest am Boden (Feet Firmly on the Ground), Wörgl (P)
1994 Gallery Medienkunst Tirol, Innsbruck (O)
1995 Copygramme, Municipal Gallery Schwaz (P)
1996 Diskurs der Systeme (Discourse of Systems), University of Fine Arts in Innsbruck (with 
Thomas Feuerstein)
Copy Art Book, Gallery Maerz, Linz (P)
Die Produktion bestimmt die Konsumtion (Production Determines Consumption), 
Gallery Andechs, Innsbruck (O)
1998 Mobilität (Mobility), Palais Liechtenstein, Feldkirch (P)
Collezione tirolo, Austrian Cultural Institute Rome (P)
Einbahn 175 (Oneway 175), façade installation at Museum Ferdinandeum, jointly with 
x-tra künstlerinnen kooperative
1999 Poster exhibit Innsbruck – Pristina/Galerie im Taxispalais
Kunst und Medien (Art and Media), Galerie am Grillhof (with Kurt Lang)
Exhibits in Public Spaces
1996: Poster: Herrenseilschaften (Men’s Clubs)
On the occasion of the event “In Lücken des Gedenkens” (Memory Lapses), Innsbruck 1996 (with
Barbara Hundegger)
1997: Poster: Wir, das seien alle (We, every one of us)
On the occasion of the International Day of Action Against Violence against Women, Innsbruck
1997 (with Barbara Hundegger)
1998: Einbahn 175 (Oneway 175)
Façade installation in the balustrade series, Tiroler Landesmuseum (State Museum of Tyrol),
Innsbruck 1998, jointly with x-tra künstlerinnen kooperative
1999: Poster exhibit: Innsbruck – Pristina
In three locations of Innsbruck, organised by the Galerie im Taxispalais.
Western industrial societies tend
to idealise the family. Families
smile at us from billboards and
from the TV screen. A perfect
world! The children are always
neat and clean, the mothers re-
laxed, the fathers present, and
the apartments tidy. All of us
know that real life is often quite
different. In the Family Ob-
server, we did not want to hide
the discrepancy between our
most cherished ideals and the
everyday reality behind the
embellished photos. To achieve
this more complete picture of
reality, we organised a com-
petition for young artists, in 
co-operation with the Federal
Curator of Arts in Austria. The
winners are Christine Susanna
Prantauer (Innsbruck) (first
prize), Hildegard Haselgrübler
and Beate Rathmayr (Linz)
(second prize), and Michaela
Niederkircher (Innsbruck) (third
prize). Ruth Noack (Vienna)
won a special prize.
The Tyrolian Christine
Prantauer has illustrated this
issue of the Family Observer. In
her photos, she shows a section
of the ‘real world’: the world of
kids encompassing the topics
addressed by adults.
Irene M. Kernthaler
A Work of Art, a Slice of Life
Christine Susanna PRANTAUER
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